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PATENTLY UNCERTAIN 
Daniel R. Cahoy* 
ABSTRACT—Innovation is an inherently uncertain process. Success is 
typically coupled with risk and we can only hope that those with great ideas 
will persevere. To encourage innovation, society reduces some of the 
innovation risk through structures like funding systems, regulation, and of 
course intellectual property rights. But what happens when uncertainty 
strikes the legal protection devices themselves? Faced with unclear rules 
and increasingly speculative rewards, some innovators may simply stop 
playing the game. 
Such uncertainty has recently been a topic of great concern in the U.S. 
patent system. Some believe that the suddenly unknowable nature of 
fundamental questions like what is patentable has had the effect of 
dramatically undermining legal incentives. Others question whether a crisis 
really exists. They point out that uncertainty can have positive effects, and 
even, be a source of strategic advantage. How can we tell good uncertainty 
from bad? 
This article provides a novel framework for evaluating patent 
uncertainty that explains how complaints and complacency can exist 
contemporaneously. It draws on the behavioral economics literature to 
provide a deeper understanding of how innovators react to unknown legal 
environments. Based on this analysis, the article identifies three different 
types of legal uncertainty: (1) investment-killing; (2) if-then; and (3) 
remedial uncertainly. It asserts that only the first creates a problem that 
must be addressed by legal reform, while the others are actually essential to 
a healthy innovation system. The article concludes with specific 
prescriptions for addressing negative uncertainty that depend on both firm 
and policymaker action. 
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I spent twenty-two years on the Federal Circuit and nine years since 
dealing with patent cases, and I cannot predict in a given case whether 
eligibility will be found or not found. If I can’t do it, how can bankers, 
venture capitalists, business executives and all of the other players in the 
system make reliable predictions and sensible decisions? 
Hon. Paul R. Michel (Ret.).1 
INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty and innovation go hand-in-hand. Changing consumer 
preferences, unforeseen advances in technology, and the shifting sands of 
global trade are among the innumerable complicating factors that are 
impossible for inventors to predict. To engage in such an endeavor, one 
must be comfortable with risk. Thus, society incentivizes risk-taking by 
providing limited exclusivity through rights like patents that, in turn, 
convey monopoly profits.2 At least, this is the traditional innovation policy 
 
 1 The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual 
Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Hon. Paul R. Michel (Ret.)), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-i 
[https://perma.cc/CX9E-B74Y] (advance video to 00:21:46). 
 2 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent 
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 90–93 (2004) (discussing “patent incentive basics”). For a more 
detailed economics view, see SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 34–39 (2004) 
(describing the role of intellectual property as the exception to a competitive market in order to 
encourage the development of valuable information).  
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saw that undergirds the modern intellectual property system. But what 
happens when uncertainty strikes the very legal protection devices 
themselves? Incentives may suddenly become unclear and the rewards 
more speculative. At some point, uncertain rules may simply cause some 
innovators to stop playing the game. 
This is no idle concern, as there is evidence that intellectual property 
uncertainty may be growing. The United States, in particular, has been 
singled out for its drift toward unstable and unpredictable standards in such 
fundamental areas as patentable subject matter and enforceability. 3 
According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “the U.S. is no longer a 
global leader [in patent protection] . . . owing to uncertainty over 
patentability standards and a relatively low score for opposition 
proceedings.”4 The Chamber’s 2018 global index of the environment for 
patent rights ranks the U.S. tied for twelfth in the world,5 down significantly 
from past years.6 Other voices in the business and inventor community 
have reflected similar apprehension.7 The sentiments are worthy of 
attention, because they capture rising innovator and investor concern, 
which can ultimately impact innovative activity. 
Is the anxiety justified? Unfortunately, our traditional policy tools are 
not up to the task of assessing whether there really is an uncertainty risk. 
Standard legal analysis is consumed with the pursuit of doctrinally correct 
 
 3 See, e.g., Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility 
Doctrine is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 955–59 (2017) 
(explaining that recent uncertainty in obtaining patent rights has undermined innovator incentives to 
create and demonstrating a comparative disadvantage between the U.S., Europe, and China); Susan M. 
Gerber & A. Patricia Campbell, Patent Eligibility Remains Uncertain, Even After Recent Efforts to 
Bring Clarity, LAW.COM (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.law.com/2019/01/11/patent-eligibility-remains-
uncertain-even-after-recent-efforts-to-bring-clarity/ [https://perma.cc/6YVP-LQYM]; Russell Slifer, 
Weakened Patent System Causes U.S. to Slip as a Global Leader of IP Protection, THE HILL (Aug. 4, 
2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/345370-weakened-patent-system-causes-us-to-
slip-as-a-global-leader-of [https://perma.cc/F397-QQSS]. 
 4 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE’S GLOB. INNOVATION POLICY CTR., CREATE: U.S. CHAMBER 
INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 36 (2018), https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMM4-GRJV].  
 5 Id.  
 6 Richard Lloyd, U.S. Patent System Slips Again in Key IP Rankings Ramping Up Pressure on New 
USPTO Director, IAM MEDIA (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/us-patent-
system-slips-again-key-ip-rankings-ramping-pressure-new-uspto-director [https://perma.cc/ML7K-
D4FP] (observing that the fall to twelfth is a trend downward from previous heights).  
 7 See Stijepko Tokic, Impact of Legal (Un)certainty on Patent Valuation: What Investors Should 
Know Before Investing in Patents, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 363, 365 (2012) (explaining all of the ways that 
uncertainty in patentability and enforcement can impact patent value for business investors); Jeffrey 
Killian, Can I Hold on Long Enough Until the Madness Stops?, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/09/13/hold-until-madness-stops/id=101095/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y2UV-FBBN] (describing an inventor’s journey through the patent process with an 
invention ultimately ruled “abstract”).  
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outcomes,8 or advocating for a strong or weak IP system,9 necessarily 
undervaluing the ex-ante impact of uncertainty. Moreover, commentators 
typically consider the post hoc intellectual property environment without 
necessarily addressing the innovators who are dissuaded from participating. 
For example, in a recent statistics-driven article, noted patent academic, 
Mark Lemley, reflects on the “resiliency” of the patent system.10 He finds 
that, despite concern over bad patents, trolling owners and uncertain 
standards, the number of applications continues to go up.11 So do the 
number of litigations.12 The natural conclusion is that innovation survives 
intact despite uncertainty, but such an assessment cannot count the 
inventors who abandoned their activity or chose secrecy rather than the risk 
of the patent system.13 
 
 8 For example, articles address the doctrinally-correct way to define invention. See, e.g., Kevin 
Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1279 (2014) 
(considering how contemporary patent doctrine provide a de facto limit on the overreach of patent 
protection over pure knowledge); Maximilian R. Petersen, Note, Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Was 
it a Patentable Machine or an Unpatentable “Algorithm”? On Principle and Expediency in Current 
Patent Law Doctrines Relating to Computer-Implemented Inventions, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90 
(1995) (CCPA doctrine related to the patentability of software). Others consider modifying doctrine in 
ways such as adding carve-outs from patent protection. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine 
of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (advocating for the addition of a fair use 
doctrine in patent law); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008) (arguing for non-commercial research exemption to patent 
infringement doctrine). A recent, broader work describes a more theoretical value for accuracy in patent 
law in general, and although this may seem equivalent to uncertainty, the author is actually describing 
the impact of mismatched incentives. See Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent 
System, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1217, 1258–62 (2017).  
 9 Compare Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 263 (1995) (arguing that domestic research and development funding will dwindle if patent 
rights are weakened, to the benefit of foreign competitors), and George Selgin & John L. Turner, Strong 
Steam, Weak Patents, or the Myth of Watt’s Innovation-Blocking Monopoly, Exploded, 54 J.L. & ECON. 
841 (2011) (using a corrected story of James Watt’s steam engine patent to counter arguments that 
strong patents reduce innovation), with Giovanni Dosi et al., Knowledge, Competition and Innovation: 
Is Strong IPR Protection Really Needed for More and Better Innovations?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 471 (2007) (reconsidering the generally held notion that protecting innovators from 
competition enhances innovation), and William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents, 
54 B.C. L. REV. 1909 (2013) (suggesting that strong U.S. patent rights reduce U.S. competitiveness 
globally).  
 10 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2016).  
 11 Id. at 14–18.  
 12 Id. at 19–21.  
 13 This is not to say that no one has attempted to model the shift. In a fascinating historical study, 
economist Petra Moser looked at innovation displayed at the nineteenth-century World’s Fairs. Petra 
Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs, 
95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214 (2005). She determined that countries without strong patent protection 
produced innovation from industries in which patents are less important and secrecy is possible. Id. at 
1231–32.  
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To truly model the impact of uncertainty, a behaviorist point of view 
that considers the pre-investment world of the innovator is required. From 
this perspective, patents are innovation incentives only because they are 
uncertainty reduction mechanisms.14 And when the patent bargain is 
undermined due to ex post revision of the standards and terms, ambiguity 
arises, and the promise of uncertainty reduction is less effective. The 
system is not only weakened, but rather provides an inconsistent and 
unknown pathway that allows others to chaotically capture rights.15 
However, a behaviorist view also acknowledges that uncertainty can be 
useful at times. An innovator believing that she has superior knowledge of 
the future may have a competitive advantage in an uncertain environment. 
Because innovation is a process rather than an event,16 one can make 
strategic choices in terms of claiming or enforcement that may dissuade 
others confronting the unknown. Uncertainty can even be beneficial in 
framing remedies that prevent opportunistic actors from behaving 
immorally just up to the point of liability. 
How can we tell whether the bad uncertainty is overwhelming the 
good? This article cuts through the fog by looking at the issue from the 
perspective of those who create. It provides a novel framework for 
evaluating uncertainty that better explains why complaints and 
complacency seem to exist at the same time. The article is a significant 
departure from the literature on uncertainty that describes the impact of 
uncertain patents,17 uncertain enforcement,18 overall system uncertainty,19 or 
 
 14 See, e.g., Dirk Czarnitzki & Andrew A. Toole, Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty, and R&D 
Investment, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 147, 151–53 (2011) (considering patent rights as real options and 
establishing that patents stimulate R&D investment by reducing a firm’s sensitivity to market 
uncertainty).  
 15 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 6 (2013) 
(asserting that Patent Assertion Entities take advantage of uncertainty of claim validity and scope to 
force settlements).  
 16 Raghu Garud et al., Perspectives on Innovation Processes, 7 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 773, 774–
75 (2013) (describing innovation as “more than the emergence of novel ideas”).  
 17 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications, 96 B.U. 
L. REV. 1117 (2016) (discussing patent system uncertainty generally but focusing on resolving 
application uncertainty); Emily Michiko Morris, Res or Rules? Patent and the (Uncertain) Rules of the 
Game, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 481 (2012) (detailing ambiguity in claim construction 
and critiquing the analogies to property deeds); Greg Reilly, Commentary, Completing the Picture of 
Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 1353 (2014) (discussing the idea that claim construction 
is rendered even more uncertain by Federal Circuit rules); Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent 
Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1758 (2011) (describing some benefits in retaining uncertainty 
in patent scope).  
 18 See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court’s 
Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 13 (2003) (describing the problem with ascertaining the limits in the doctrine of 
equivalents after the Supreme Court’s Warner-Jenkinson case); Gregory J. Wallace, Note, Toward 
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simply the idea that unknowns in patent law are bad.20 Rather, it looks to 
the behavioral economics literature for clues on how to identify 
problematic uncertainty, and actually separate it from beneficial uncertainty 
or the inherent risk in innovation. Using this lens, this article for the first 
time identifies three different types of legal uncertainty that are likely to 
impact innovators: (1) investment-killing uncertainty, (2) if-then 
uncertainty, and (3) remedial uncertainty. It asserts that only the first 
creates a problem that must be addressed by policy makers and suggests 
appropriate action. 
Part I describes the nature of innovation and unknowns, explaining 
how risk and uncertainty impact the innovation process in both positive and 
negative ways. Part II explains how mechanisms like patents are supposed 
to work to reduce harmful uncertainty and facilitate innovation. Part III 
describes the rise of new legal uncertainty and introduces a framework for 
evaluating its effect. The issue of patentable subject matter is highlighted as 
a focal point and potential target for reform, but it is contrasted with the 
law of obviousness and fee-shifting to demonstrate uncertainty that is less 
harmful. Part IV provides a prescriptive outlook on the optimal way to 
address ambiguity, at both the policy level and for the firm. In the end, the 
article concludes that we cannot—and should not—try to eliminate all 
uncertainty in patent law, but we can find a better way to cohabitate. 
 
Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases after Festo and Markman: A Proposal for a 
Specialized Patent Trial Court with a Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383 (2004) 
(discussing the problem of uncertainty in the outcome of patent cases until the end of the appeal 
process).  
 19 Robert M Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 20-28 
(1992) (modeling the utility of risk or quantifiable uncertainty in setting the obviousness standard for 
incentivizing the appropriate investment; Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, 
and Patent Law, 43 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1109 (2010) (delineating various sources of uncertainty in 
the patent system and suggesting institutional solutions for addressing it); Brian P. Murphy & Daniel P. 
Murphy, Bilsky’s “Machine-or-Transformation” Test: Uncertain Prognosis for Diagnostic Methods 
and Personalized Medicine Patents, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 755 (2010) 
(discussing the uncertain application of a new Federal Circuit test for patentability of business method 
patents); Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing 
Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 191 (2008) (advocating for increased disclosure in software patent applications to increase 
certainty in subject matter); Kelly Todd, Note, The Promising Viral Threat to Bacterial Resistance: The 
Uncertain Patentability of Phage Therapeutics and the Necessity of Alternative Incentives, 68 DUKE 
L.J. 767 (2019) (discussing the uncertainty as to whether phage therapeutics are patentable and the need 
for alternative protections in the wake of Alice and Mayo).  
 20 See generally Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
103 (2013).  
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I. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN INNOVATION 
Whether groundbreaking or merely incremental, innovation is a 
critical driver of increased productivity on the firm and country level.21 
Innovation can be described as the “invention, development, and 
implementation of new ideas.”22 Although it is common to think of 
innovation as a eureka-like moment that falls upon a prescient inventor or 
creator, academics studying the field see a more complex picture. Whereas 
the initial invention may correlate with that moment of insight (with a 
reduction to something concrete), innovation is the ability to take new ideas 
and commercialize or otherwise make them available.23 This rarely is 
accomplished by an individual working in isolation.24 Rather, realized 
innovation is a non-linear process with many steps, interactions and 
contributing stakeholders.25 Embedded in this viewpoint is the idea that 
there are systemic attributes that promote innovation, as well as dynamic 
and relational properties that shape the path of innovation.26 The process is 
something that can be managed and optimized.27 It can also be derailed by 
systemic uncertainty. 
The presence of uncertainty appears troubling at first. If societal rules 
are ill-defined and subject to shifting interpretations, the structure of the 
legal system would seem to be weakened.28 This is a natural assumption in 
the case of patent law, which many see as reliant on strong property origins 
 
 21 Lucia Foster et al., Innovation, Productivity Dispersion, and Productivity Growth, CTR. FOR 
ECON. STUD. (Feb.2018), https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2018/CES-WP-18-08.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SEX4-QCL4] (reviewing literature linking innovation to productivity growth, but 
noting other factors have an influence).  
 22 Garud et al., supra note 16, at 774. See also Vernon W. Ruttan, Usher and Schumpeter on 
Invention, Innovation, and Technological Change, 73 Q.J. ECON. 596, 603 (1959) (reviewing 
Schumpeter’s and Usher’s work and concluding that innovation designates “any ‘new thing’ in the area 
of science, technology, or art”).  
 23 Garud et al., supra note 16, at 774–76 (describing literature on innovation processes and their 
support of an “evolutionary” perspective on innovation).  
 24 Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 712–13 (2012) (arguing 
that “singletons” are rare kinds of inventions).  
 25 Consider generally ANDREW H. VAN DER VEN, DOUGLASS E. POLLEY, RAGHU GARUD & 
SANKARAN VENKATARAMAN, THE INNOVATION JOURNEY (1999) (reviewing multiple examples of 
innovation in a longitudinal study and noting how messy and ad hoc the process can be).  
 26 See, e.g., Maria Weimer & Luisa Marin, The Role of Law in Managing the Tension between Risk 
and Innovation: Introduction to the Special Issue on Regulating New and Emerging Technologies, 7 
EUR. J. RISK. REG. 469, 469–70 (2016) (describing generally how law can be viewed as a barrier to 
innovation and an important societal protection, and the key is understanding how to accomplish the 
latter without the former).  
 27 Garud et al, supra note 16, at 775.  
 28 See Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (“What is really 
undesirable about uncertain rules of law is that they leave persons unsure of their entitlements while 
affording unfettered discretion to official decisionmakers.”).  
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
8 
requiring predictable rules.29 One might presume that any uncertainty in 
patent law necessarily reduces innovation incentives, and the cure is to 
clarify the rules by rigid statute if necessary.30 However, the impact of 
uncertainty in the law is more nuanced, particularly when it applies to the 
inherently indefinite area of innovation. To the individual innovator, some 
sources of uncertainty may create substantial roadblocks. But others may 
be neutral or even spur innovation. A single-minded effort to eliminate 
legal uncertainty could be counterproductive, and it is therefore, useful to 
consider its broader role in innovator decision making. 
It is useful to first appreciate how uncertainty can manifest as an 
innovation problem. With that in mind, it is possible to unpack the nature 
of uncertainty in innovation and identify the attributes that define its impact 
on an individual inventor or firm. A behavioral economics approach 
appropriately grounds such an assessment. From this more contextualized 
understanding, the idealized role of patent legal instruments is apparent, as 
well as the negative impacts when they are the source of uncertainty. 
A. Uncertainty Matters: An Invention Story 
Despite the inherent risks in innovation, participants in the system 
count on some predictability and certainty in legal structures to justify their 
investments. When patent certainty is undermined, the benefits of playing 
the innovation game are threatened. Consider the case of Dr. Francesco 
Pompei and his forehead thermometer, an invention that may not have 
transformed medical science, but surely made life with a minor illness just 
a bit better.31 
 
 29 See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 717–27 (2001) (describing the role of property in creating incentives for follow-on 
commercialization in addition to the initial invention); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (explaining that there are reasons that patents 
should not be fully analogized to physical property).  
 30 For example, the Intellectual Property Owner’s Association (IPO) and the American Intellectual 
Property Organization (AIPLA) have made a joint proposal for a wholesale replacement of the part of 
the patent statute that is the source of uncertainty on patentable subject matter. Joint AIPLA-IPO 
Proposal on Patent Eligibility, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, https://www.aipla.org/policy-
advocacy/legislative/joint-aipla-ipo-proposal-on-patent-eligibility [https://perma.cc/QJ9M-6FD3]. It 
advocates for defined and cabined exceptions. Id.  
 31 See About Exergen Corporation, EXERGEN CORP., https://www.exergen.com/about-us/about-
exergen-corporation [https://perma.cc/7N87-9JM6] (describing the history of Exergen, founded on its 
temporal artery thermometer invented by Francesco Pompei). This example was inspired by a post by 
Dennis Crouch on his excellent website, Patently-O. Dennis Crouch, Eligible: Method of Measuring 
Body Temperature, PATENTLY-O.COM (March 9, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/03/eligible-
measuring-temperature.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=
Feed%3A+PatentlyO+%28Dennis+Crouch%27s+Patently-O%29 [https://perma.cc/5MBA-UVC8].  
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In 1998, Dr. Pompei, a researcher associated with Harvard 
University,32 invented a method for measuring body temperature based on 
heat flow at the surface of the forehead.33 Existing thermometer technology 
depended on invasive techniques that required some bodily enclosure.34 The 
most advanced (and least objectionable) alternatives at the time—eardrum 
or underarm thermometers—still required some intrusion into the body. Dr. 
Pompei’s idea of using the temporal artery as an infrared measurement site 
and comparing it to ambient temperature to obtain an accurate body 
temperature was radical and not readily accepted by the medical 
community.35 But such a non-invasive technique was highly desired by 
patients and significant market interest was evident.36 In order to convince 
physicians and regulators that his methods were medically reliable and 
establish that a marketable product could be produced with the idea, Dr. 
Pompei was required to undertake significant investments of time and 
money.37 Such investments would only be reasonable if he could retain 
some control over the invention in the future. 
Thus, Dr. Pompei filed for a patent on a “Temporal Artery 
Temperature Detector,” which was eventually granted and issued in 2001.38 
With this, and several other related patents, he built a highly successful 
firm called Exergen to manufacture and sell non-invasive thermometers.39 
According to the company’s materials, the thermometers are used in half of 
U.S. hospitals and are in the hands of over four million consumers.40 Such 
success breeds competition, and other firms have an obvious interest in 
using Dr. Pompei’s patented methods to carve out their own portions of this 
 
 32 Dr. Pompei has been profiled as a successful entrepreneur related to his work in non-invasive 
thermography. See Allyson Every, Father and Son Tackle Heat, Sound, MIT TECH. REV. (June 1, 
2005), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/404219/father-and-son-tackle-heat-sound/ 
[https://perma.cc/7YAV-Q6PJ].  
 33 Exergen’s Opposition to Brookland’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity Under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 at 2–3, Exergen Corp. v. Brooklands, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 307 (D. Mass. 2015) 
[hereinafter Exergen’s Opposition].  
 34 Id. at 5.  
 35 Amy Norton, Accuracy of Forehead-Scanning Thermometers Doubted, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 
2007), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thermometers-idUSPAR05104120070810. 
[https://perma.cc/9PVC-J7BS].  
 36 Karel Allegaert et al., Tympanic, Infrared Skin, and Temporal Artery Scan Thermometers 
Compared with Rectal Measurement in Children: A Real-Life Assessment, 76 CURRENT THERAPEUTIC 
RES. 34, 36 (2014) (describing the desire for non-invasive thermometers in the treatment of children, 
and noting that, while all are second-best, temporal artery scans are closest to traditional methods).  
 37 Exergen’s Opposition, supra note 33, at 6. See also About Exergen Corporation, supra note 31.  
 38 U.S. Pat. No. 6,292,685 (issued Sept. 18, 2001).  
 39 See About Exergen Corporation, supra note 31 (“Exergen holds over 100 issued and pending 
U.S. and foreign patents . . . .”).  
 40 Id.  
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valuable market. Thanks to his patents, Dr. Pompei could expect a 
continued return on his investment . . . unless it turns out that Dr. Pompei 
did not claim a patentable invention. 
In two cases, one against Brooklands, Inc. and the other against 
Thermomedics, Inc., separate district courts ruled that a continuation of the 
original patent41 was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for claiming a natural 
phenomenon with no inventive step.42 One of the invalid claims, no. 51, 
reads: 
A method of detecting human body temperature comprising: measuring 
temperature of a region of skin of the forehead; and processing the measured 
temperature to provide a body temperature approximation based on heat flow 
from an internal body temperature to ambient temperature.43 
According to the two district courts, the “measuring” and “processing” 
aspects of the claims added nothing inventive.44 
However, a third, contemporaneous case against another defendant, 
Kaz, yielded a completely different result. That case involved the following 
claim from the same patent, claim no. 14: 
A method of detecting human body temperature comprising: making at least 
three radiation readings per second while moving a radiation detector to scan 
across a region of skin over an artery to electronically determine a body 
temperature approximation, distinct from skin surface temperature.45 
The district court in that case found that, although the steps beyond 
the natural phenomenon were generally known, they were not “well 
understood or routine” in the context of measuring body temperature.46 
In an unpublished opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the Kaz court’s determination that the patent was not 
invalid.47 The claims at issue in these two cases are extremely similar, and 
 
 41 U.S. Pat. No. 7,787,938 (issued Aug. 31, 2010).  
 42 Exergen Corp. v. Brooklands Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 307, 312–17 (D. Mass. 2015); Exergen Corp. 
v. Thermomedics, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 200, 203–08 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Exergen Corp. v. 
Sanomedics Int’l Holdings, Inc., 653 F. App’x 760 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
 43 U.S. Pat. No. 7,787,938 (issued Aug. 31, 2010).  
 44 Exergen Corp., 125 F. Supp. 3d at 317 (“Measuring temperature or radiation is simply not an 
inventive or unconventional step in the field of thermometry”); Exergen Corp., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 208 
(“The asserted claims lack an inventive concept outside of the laws of nature and are not eligible for 
patent protection.”).  
 45 U.S. Pat. No. 7,787,938 (issued Aug. 31, 2010). The actual claim that was litigated at the district 
court level and appealed was claim 24, which was dependent on claim 14. Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, 
Inc., 725 F. App’x 959, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This means that the case involved claim 14 with the 
additional limitation that the artery referred to in the claim is a temporal artery. Id.  
 46 Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 366, 371 (D. Mass. 2016). 
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the difference in validity appears to rest on what is sufficient to transform 
an otherwise unpatentable phenomenon into a protectable invention. In 
dissent, Judge Hughes argued that the district court erred because, “Rather 
than finding that the claim elements were not routine or conventional, [it] 
focused on whether those elements were routinely or conventionally used 
for the purpose of calculating core body temperature.”48 This is arguably a 
different legal test than prescribed by precedent. In fact, Judge Hughes 
noted that the Federal Circuit had rejected such a test in an earlier case.49 
Two invalidations and one not-invalid verdict over three cases, all in 
the District of Massachusetts. How is an innovator expected to navigate 
such a mix of derived-on-the-fly tests, years before the invention is 
litigated? Following a substantial investment of time and materials, as well 
as a commitment to disclosure through the patent system. Dr. Pompei and 
Exergen were ultimately left with no real basis for valuing the risk. They 
could only look forward to an uncertain legal environment and hope for the 
best. A less committed innovator might not opt for such a challenge, and 
the world might be worse off. 
It is cases like Dr. Pompei’s that worry many in the intellectual 
property community, particularly small inventors. His invention is not a 
mere arrangement for taking pictures against a white background50 or a 
method of swinging on a swing,51 but a rather a concrete, useful advance in 
medical technology. A larger entity may be in a better position to fund a 
risky patent application or negotiate with the examiner.52 But those without 
such protection may abandon a project or rely on secrecy.53 Thus, the key 
question: to prevent a suboptimal outcome, how much do we need to 
protect the “Dr. Pompeis” of the world from uncertainty? 
B. A Behavioral Economics View on Uncertainty and Decision-Making 
Uncertainty imbues every decision about the future to some extent. 
There are so many factors that can impact what will eventually occur that 
no one can move ahead with complete security. But not all unknowns 
confronted by decision-makers are equal. Some can be characterized in 
 
 47 Exergen Corp., 725 F. App’x at 966–67.  
 48 Id. at 975.  
 49 Id.  
 50 U.S. Pat. No. 8,676,045 (issued Mar. 18, 2014).  
 51 U.S. Pat. No. 6,368,227 (issued Apr. 9, 2002).  
 52 Professor Lemley has argued that one should not focus on incentivizing a particular inventor, 
since few advances depend on one person. Lemley, supra note 24, at 712–13. Rather, we are 
incentivizing patent races. Id. at 750–51. Regardless, the impact of uncertainty in dissuading an 
individual or participants of a race may not be significantly different.  
 53 Moser, supra note 13, at 1231–32.  
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terms of probability and effectively managed, while others may be so 
fraught with undefined radicals and factors as to defy conception. Some 
may arise through the actions of the decision-maker, while others may be 
generated by outside forces. Some may involve issues present before or at 
the time of investment, yet others may arise after costs have been sunk. At 
base, uncertainty can be positive or negative, depending on the nature and 
context. This rich environment of uncertainty means that there is no one-
size-fits-all solution or path. Not every uncertainty must be resolved, and a 
misaligned system for addressing uncertainty can actually create more 
problems than it solves. 
In conceptualizing the nature of unknowns, there is perhaps no more 
cited academic than economist Frank Knight. He is credited with 
articulating the difference between risk and true uncertainty that has helped 
guide modern analysis of innovation and business decision-making.54 
According to Professor Knight, risk exists when the future is unknown, but 
the probabilities of the future outcomes can be assessed with certainty.55 
With this knowledge, one can reasonably decide on the best path, even if 
there are many possible outcomes. When those outcomes have a financial 
impact, one can value each path based on the probabilities and an 
appropriate time-related discount.56 This is the basis of many business 
valuation techniques.57 It is also well represented by decision tree analysis, 
which attempts to place a value on decision “nodes” according to the 
probability of receiving payoffs along different paths.58 
On the other hand, true uncertainty exists when one cannot even 
identify the systems or factors that would give rise to the probabilities of 
future outcomes.59 As Donald Rumsfeld famously declared in the wake of 
the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, these are “unknown 
unknowns.”60 Without an understanding of how the future could shift, it is 
essentially impossible to know with any confidence the risk of any 
particular path. Professor Knight describes states in which some of these 
 
 54 See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 903 (2011) (explaining Knight’s 
contribution to understanding risk and uncertainty).  
 55 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233 (1921) (reprinted 1964). 
 56 Id. 
 57 GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 165 (3d ed. 2000). 
 58 See David Teece & Sohvi Leih, Uncertainty, Innovation and Dynamic Capabilities: An 
Introduction, 58 CAL. MGMT. REV., no. 4, 2016, at 5, 8 fig.1 (graphically depicting the difference 
between risk and uncertainty using a decision tree as compared to radiating probability questions).  
 59 KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 233–34. 
 60 Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Philip Stephens, The Unwitting Wisdom of Rumsfeld’s 
Unknowns, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, at 19. 
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uncertainties could be grouped, such that paths could be broadly assessed, 
but he noted that there are states of uncertainty that are incapable of even 
this level of analysis.61 
To be fair, Knight’s risk/uncertainty distinction has been criticized for 
lack of relevance in the real world.62 On paper, it seems reasonable to 
qualify some issues as being solvable through probability analysis, but in 
fact, reality is almost always more complicated. Any determination about 
the future implicates a number of systems that are hard to fully ascertain. 
Moreover, when other actors are involved, biases and heuristics make 
human behavior inherently uncertain. Thus, it has been suggested that 
nearly everything beyond lotteries and casino gambling is a question of 
uncertainty, not risk.63 But this criticism, while technically correct, does not 
capture the distinction Knight intended. He was comparing issues that we 
can reasonably wrap our heads around leading to informed decisions with 
those that have too many unknown variables, and for which, we have only 
“partial knowledge.”64 This is a distinction that realistically impacts 
individuals and firms. 
Other economists have discussed the existence of uncertainty in 
business decision-making, often in the context of financial markets. John 
Maynard Keynes, for example, reflected Knight’s distinction between risk 
and uncertainty and noted that investment decisions are typically made 
under conditions of uncertainty.65 Keynes also noted that there are 
differences in individuals regarding their uncertainty preferences, and 
entrepreneurs are often more willing to move forward with a lack of 
knowledge.66 
Although unknowns cannot be avoided, classical economists have 
traditionally assumed that individuals and firms can still behave rationally. 
If one does not know exactly which probability distribution among many 
 
 61 KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 238–240. 
 62 See Geoffrey T.F. Brook, Uncertainty, Profit and Entrepreneurial Action: Frank Knight’s 
Contribution Reconsidered, 32 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 221, 226 (2010) (“Risk refers only to instances 
where there is certainty about the distribution of possible outcomes, and this certainty exists only in the 
textbook theories of perfect competition.”). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Richard N. Langlois & Metin M. Cosgel, Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the Firm: a 
New Interpretation, 31 ECON. ENQUIRY 456, 459–60 (1993) (explaining the meaning of Knight’s 
distinction between risk and uncertainty).  
 65 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 355–56 (1921). 
 66 Richard A. Posner, Keynes and Coase, 54 J.L. & ECON. S31, S37 (2011) (comparing an 
entrepreneur’s willingness to take “noncalculable risks” to others of equal intelligence by setting forth 
“empirical evidence that economic growth is indeed . . . positively correlated with tolerance for 
uncertainty (low uncertainty aversion) and, a closely related point, that entrepreneurs are less averse to 
uncertainty than are other persons.”). 
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will result from a decision, one can still engage in rational decision making 
using one’s own subjective expected utility (SEU).67 Using this model, 
individuals determine subjective probabilities based on their knowledge 
and make the move that results in the highest individual utility given the 
probabilities.68 It does not matter if the individual does not actually know 
which probability distribution applies. This is obviously a model that 
depends on some conception of potential probabilities. When probabilities 
associated with outcomes knowingly cannot be determined at all, 
behavioral economists would argue that irrationality will at times prevail. 
To distinguish the specific kind of uncertainty that is not amenable to 
subjective expected utility theory, economists use the term “ambiguity.”69 
Ambiguity is a situation in which an individual has no basis for assessing 
future outcomes because, essentially, the games that will be played are 
unknown.70 Daniel Ellsberg described this state in 1961 as a situation that 
cannot be resolved with subjective expected utility, demonstrating instead 
that ambiguity leads to irrational behavior.71 The field of behavioral 
economics owes much to this work. Unfortunately, the terms uncertainty 
and ambiguity are frequently interchanged outside of formal economics, so 
it is important to keep in mind the basic premise of Ellsberg’s ambiguity: 
inability to determine the probabilities that exist.72 
Given the nature of missing information in ambiguity scenarios, the 
state is often temporal. In other words, as one gains additional knowledge, 
particularly about probabilities of occurrence, aspects of ambiguity 
disappear, and the choices become clearer. This is analogous to Bayesian 
updating in expected utility,73 in that subsequent information is used to 
revise previous estimates of figure probabilities.74 In some cases, it may be 
possible for a decision maker to engage in efforts to attain the missing 
information or realign the decision after the conditions become more 
evident. But for decisions that must take place at a particular time period, 
 
 67 LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 6–9 (1954). 
 68 Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty 
and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY, 325, 326 (1992). 
 69 David Dequech, Fundamental Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 26 EASTERN ECON. J., 41, 45 (2000). 
 70 See Stefan T. Trautmann, Ferdinand M. Vieder, & Peter P. Wakker, Causes of Ambiguity 
Aversion: Known Versus Unknown Preferences, 36 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 225, 225 (2008) 
(differentiating risk from ambiguity). 
 71 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643, 656–67 (1961).  
 72 Id. 
 73 Gary Charness & Dan Levin, When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of 
Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1300, 1300 (2005).  
 74 Id. 
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against information that will only be available ex post, the impact of the 
ambiguity will be present. 
Significantly, the very existence of uncertainty or ambiguity can be a 
disincentive in and of itself. The description and study of this negative 
impact of the unknown is an important area of behavioral economics. 
Termed “ambiguity aversion,” it is the idea that individuals will avoid 
economically rational choices when uncertainty is present, or at least 
require an uncertainty premium.75 Ellsberg is credited with identifying this 
phenomenon.76 His work employed a game theoretic approach to 
demonstrate the behavior subjects exhibit in the face of ambiguity that 
manifests in a kind of conservatism that protects against the worst-case 
scenario.77 It violates subjective utility theory.78 Even explaining the 
rational choice to a subject will not necessarily dispel the aversion.79 
Certainly, this behavior will not occur every time there is an unknown. But 
it explains that individuals are not always operating on some sense of the 
probabilities of future outcome and that uncertainty should have 
measurable effects. 
In the wake of Ellsberg’s work, multiple studies have confirmed that 
ambiguity aversion is a real behavioral phenomenon and have added 
multiple dimensions.80 For example, subjects will pay a premium to avoid 
ambiguity.81 They will respond with more aversion when the range of 
probabilities increases.82 And they do not appear to be reacting to the 
psychology that some hostile bias is creating the ambiguity—the ambiguity 
itself is the factor underlying the aversion.83 
 
 75 David Weisbach, Introduction: Legal Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty, 44 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S319, S322 (2015) (“Only by increasing the payoffs for the ambiguous bet can individuals be 
made indifferent.”). 
 76 Id. at S321. 
 77 Ellsberg, supra note 71, at 646. 
 78 See SAVAGE, supra note 67. 
 79 Weisbach, supra note 75, at S323.  
 80 See JOHN H. KAGEL & ALVIN E. ROTH, HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 646 (1995) 
(summarizing various studies); Camerer & Weber, supra note 68, at 333–37 (surveying experiments on 
ambiguity). 
 81 Shawn P. Curley & J. Frank Yates, An Empirical Evaluation of Descriptive Models of Ambiguity 
Reactions in Choice Situations, 33 J. MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOL. 397, 397 (1989); Michele Bernasconi 
& Graham Loomes, Failures of the Reduction Principle in an Ellsberg-Type Problem, 32 THEORY & 
DECISION 77, 96 (1992). 
 82 Shawn P. Curley & J. Frank Yates, The Center and Range of the Probability Interval as Factors 
Affecting Ambiguity Preferences, 36 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 273, 284 
(1985). 
 83 Shawn P. Curley, J. Frank Yates & Richard A. Abrams, Psychological Sources of Ambiguity 
Avoidance, 38 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 230, 252 (1986). 
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Ambiguity or uncertainty has even been demonstrated to have real 
world consequences beyond the laboratory. Professors Camerer and Weber 
collected and summarized a number of studies and showed that uncertainty 
is impactful in medicine and health; insurance, liability and taxes; 
marketing; and financial markets.84 In particular, studies show that markets 
have specific reactions to uncertainty that are distinguishable from those 
resulting in new valuation or risk information. For example, Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy describe “flight to quality” episodes—moving risky 
investment to safer investments—following economic crises that present an 
unanticipated form of Knightian uncertainty.85 Essentially, investors 
anticipate the worst-case scenario posed by the uncertainty and become 
overly conservative, reducing market liquidity. The fact that such episodes 
are fairly unique to the time and nature of each crisis suggests that these are 
not merely reactions to increased risk. Similarly, Cao, Wang and Zhang 
find that average individuals avoid participating in the stock market when 
there is dispersed uncertainty about market payoffs.86 
Daniel Farber described the phenomenon of uncertainty in the 
regulatory context (particularly environmental harm).87 He notes that the 
distinction between risk and unascertainable uncertainty or ambiguity 
applies here as well, and describes the fact that regulators prefer to ignore it 
and individuals try to avoid it.88 Farber explains that a well-established 
model for predicting the impact of uncertainty is the so-called, “α-
”maxmin,” which suggests that individuals can overweight the possibility 
of bad consequences (worst possible outcome) when the upside is not 
great.89 The natural result of this aversion is the precautionary principle, 
which compels action to reduce harm even when the potential for bad 
outcomes is uncertain.90 
The fact that ambiguity or uncertainty has impact may be established, 
but one must consider how it is particularly relevant in the context of 
innovation. The remaining parts of this article make this application. 
However, for the sake of clarity and consistency with the existing legal 
 
 84 Camerer & Weber, supra note 68, at 353–357. 
 85 Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Collective Risk Management in a Flight to 
Quality Episode, 63 J. FIN. 2195, 2195 (2008).  
 86 H. Henry Cao, Tan Wang & Harold H. Zhang, Model Uncertainty, Limited Market Participation 
and Asset Prices, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 1219, 1241–42 (2005). 
 87 Farber, supra note 54. 
 88 Id. at 909–11, 928–29. 
 89 Id. at 929–30. 
 90 Id. at 914–15, 930. 
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literature,91 it will favor the use of the term “uncertainty,” rather than 
“ambiguity,” to describe future unknowns that cannot be defined 
probabilistically. This is an important lexicographic distinction because the 
present article deals with patents, and the term ambiguity has a specific 
meaning there. As language-based rights they include a rich literature on 
the problems with claims qualified as “ambiguous,” a completely different 
use of the term.92 “Uncertainty” is a better term for the non-ascertainable 
probability context addressed in this article.93 
C. Uncertainty and the Will to Innovate 
Many uncertainties confront the particular world of innovators. It 
might be uncertain whether one can obtain funding to carry out research 
and development to perfect a product.94 The availability of important raw 
materials may depend on environmental, political and legal environments 
that are unclear at the time of invention;95 how the market will perceive the 
innovation, particularly if it has social implications;96 and, of course, 
whether it will be possible to negotiate the legal and regulatory structures 
may be extremely relevant, depending on the type of innovation. 
Successful firms must manage such unknowns and it shapes their decision-
making. And in some cases, the lack of knowledge about the future may 
present an insurmountable barrier and dissuade some set of actors. If 
innovations lost as a result could be contributors to important social goals 
(medical advances, efficient energy, agricultural productivity, space 
exploration, etc.), managing or minimizing negative unknowns becomes 
 
 91 For example, the most common use of the term “ambiguity” in the legal literature is to describe 
unclear language rather than probabilities of future events. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed., 2019). 
 92 See, e.g., Oskar Liivak, The Unresolved Interpretative Ambiguity of Patent Claims, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1851, 1862–65 (2016) (describing the problem of claim ambiguity). 
 93 However, the use of “ambiguity” in economics articles should be appreciated for cross-
referencing the literature in that field. 
 94 Jesper Lindgaard Christensen, The Role of Finance in National Systems of Innovation, in 
NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TOWARD A THEORY OF INNOVATION AND INTERACTIVE 
LEARNING 151, 162–63 (Bengt-Ake Lundvall, ed. 2010) (describing how stable finance reduces 
uncertainty). 
 95 This has become a particularly important issue for consumer electronics that use so-called 
“conflict minerals.” See, e.g., Shannon Raj, Note, Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and 
the Legislation that Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981 (2011). 
 96 Garud, et al., supra note 16, at 795–96 (referring to the phenomenon of “cultural complexity,” 
which relates to a product’s acceptance as dependent on social norms and structure). 
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relevant for national innovation policy.97 Thus, uncertainty in the context of 
innovation seems particularly daunting.98 
Or is it? Will uncertainty in any one of these areas actually dissuade 
an innovator, as opposed to another type of investor or market actor? 
Moreover, would it be preferable to eliminate all of these uncertainties if 
that were possible? It is one thing to say that unknowns can produce 
ambiguity aversion effects in the lab or financial markets, but it is not a 
given that uncertainty always (or even frequently) dissuades innovators. In 
other words, even if uncertainty or ambiguity has a real negative impact in 
some cases, in others, parties can likely navigate through it or even see it as 
an opportunity. 
Notably, Knight did not consider uncertainty to necessarily be a bad 
thing in the context of innovators. In fact, he believed that an entrepreneur 
must act on uncertainty in order to attain profit (which Knight defined as 
the surplus that one might attain after factoring in understood investment 
risks).99 Only one who acts in a state of uncertainty has the opportunity to 
take what others cannot and achieve something beyond what is possible in 
a state of perfect competition.100 Keynes also noted that moving ahead in 
the face of uncertainty is a characteristic of certain business people as they 
employ what he termed their “animal spirits.”101 Even Joseph Schumpeter, 
whose work is often considered in contrast to Knight and Keynes, could be 
read to support the notion that some level of uncertainty is necessary for the 
creative destruction carried out by entrepreneurs.102 The appropriate 
 
 97 See generally NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TOWARD A THEORY OF INNOVATION AND 
INTERACTIVE LEARNING (Bengt-Ake Lundvall, ed. 2010). 
 98 Engaging in a systematic literature review, Harri Jalonen attempted to categorize all of the types 
of uncertainty that impact innovation. Harri Jalonen, The Uncertainty of Innovation: A Systematic 
Review of the Literature, 4 J. MGMT. RES. E12 (2012). Jalonen derived eight general categories: 1) 
technological uncertainty, 2) market uncertainty, 3) regulatory/institutional uncertainty, 4) 
social/political uncertainty, 5) acceptance/legitimacy uncertainty, 6) managerial uncertainty, 7) timing 
uncertainty, and 8) consequence uncertainty.  
 99 KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 271. 
 100 See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1785–86 (2004) 
(discussing profit in terms of the residual’s claim over the return on risk); Stephen F. LeRoy & Larry D. 
Singell, Knight on Risk and Uncertainty, 95 J. POL. ECON. 394, 396–97 (1987). 
 101 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 
161 (1936). 
 102 Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can do About It, 28 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POL’Y J. 817, 822 (2007) (“A central premise in Schumpeter’s theory—which is the focus of this 
article—is that entrepreneurs have special skills for innovation and for dealing with uncertainty, 
although the latter quality is relatively less prominent in Schumpeter’s account.”) See generally Maria 
Brouwer, Entrepreneurship and Uncertainty: Innovation and Competition among the Many, 15 SMALL 
BUS. ECON. 149 (2000). 
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diffusion of innovation, time of entry, and necessary finance are arguably 
propelled by some level of uncertainty.103 
Against the theory that uncertainty can be positive in some cases, 
there is not surprisingly evidence of its negative impacts on innovation as 
well. For example, using matched patent data for firms innovating during 
the Great Depression, Malhar Nabar and Tom Nicolas show that high 
initial uncertainty reduced innovative activity, but firms that were able to 
update expectations recovered.104 Additionally, Minna Allarakhia and 
Anthony Wensely argue that uncertainty surrounding the availability of 
patent rights and the blocking potential of early entrants created 
disincentives for innovation in the emerging field of systems biology.105 
Harri Jalonen cites many other examples, and further argues that the overall 
gist of the literature is that uncertainty has negative innovative effects.106 
How should one reconcile these different concepts of uncertainty? 
One insight is that there is likely to be a personality component to this 
question. Some innovators may embrace a given uncertainty while others 
look for safer alternatives. Judge Richard Poser articulated the concept of 
differential behaviors in an essay written in the midst of the 2008 financial 
crisis, wherein he considered responses to an economic depression.107 He 
noted that it is not necessarily irrational to ignore some uncertainty, as 
much as it is a representation of a utility function that maximizes other 
benefits from a course of action.108 According to Judge Posner: 
People respond to uncertainty aversion in a variety of ways—trying to 
transform it into calculable risk when they can do so, as by improving 
analytical techniques or gathering additional information, and, when they 
cannot do so, substituting other methods of decision making for cost-benefit 
analysis, such as simple extrapolation from the past, decision according to 
rules of thumb, imitation of other people, minimizing sunk costs, flipping a 
coin, seeking guidance in prayer, adopting a “safety-first” policy, and building 
 
 103 E.g., Brouwer, supra note 102, at 153 (“[U]ncertainty about the time of entry arrival and 
incumbents’ retreat prompts entrants to set price equal to incumbents’ marginal cost. Uncertainty thus 
needs to be inserted in a Schumpterian model in order to achieve [these results].”).  
 104 Malhar Nabar & Tom Nicholas, Uncertainty and Innovation During the Great Depression, 
Harvard Business School Working Paper (Jan. 14, 2010), http://people.hbs.edu/tnicholas/ui.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C4MF-U6NJ]. 
 105 Minna Allarakhia and Anthony Wensley, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights in 
Systems Biology, 23 NATURE BIOTECH. 1485 (2005). 
 106 See Jalonen, supra note 98, at 7 (reviewing dozens of innovation/uncertainty articles and 
concluding “an overwhelming majority of the reviewed literature has perceived uncertainty to be 
detrimental to, or problematic for, innovation.”). 
 107 Richard A. Posner, Uncertainty Aversions and Economic Depressions, 52 CHALLENGE 25 
(2009). 
 108 Id. at 31.  
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relations of trust (often within the family) in order to create a form of 
insurance that does not rely on the calculation of premiums. A legal system 
can reduce uncertainty by, for example, requiring compensation for the taking 
of property by the government, since such takings are uncertain events.109 
He further argues that the optimal government response in the face of 
a crisis is not necessarily to reform, but to reduce uncertainty (particularly 
if the reform itself introduces uncertainty).110 
To be sure, although responses to uncertainty may be distributed, they 
are likely not random. Some communities may have uncertainty aversion 
traits in common. For example, there is significant literature supporting the 
idea that entrepreneurs are more likely to move forward in the face of 
uncertainty than others.111 Unfortunately, while evidence of differences 
among personality types gives some clue as to who is likely to respond to 
uncertainty, it does not necessarily help identify whether the overall effect 
is positive, neutral or negative. Can we know prospectively that a given 
uncertainty has the potential to blunt innovative activity? 
At base, it should be possible to make some conclusions about impact 
related to the magnitude or significance of the uncertainty. In other words, 
to what degree will the uncertainty impact the future? For example, 
whether it will be sunny or rainy on the day of a prospective product launch 
may be uncertain six months out, but this eventuality is unlikely to have 
much impact on innovative effort. However, other uncertainties, such as the 
existence of competing products or the regulatory environment, play into 
exactly how uncertainty impacts innovation. Again, without more, whether 
the swing will be positive or negative is not clear. 
To answer the impact question, one should look to research in the 
field of behavioral economics. Here, the attributes of uncertainties that are 
more likely to play a dissuading role are apparent. Consider that Heath and 
Tversky found that subjects preferred uncertainty over chance when they 
believed they were more knowledgeable about the ambiguous subject 
matter.112 Their experiments concerned uncertainty about events, such as 
presidential elections and pro football games, and when subjects had 
confidence about their information—competence in the form of knowledge, 
skill and comprehension—they elected to move ahead in spite of the 
 
 109 Id.  
 110 Id. at 38.  
 111 See Jeffrey S. McMullen & Dean A. Shepherd, Entrepreneurial Action and the Role of 
Uncertainty in the Theory of the Entrepreneur, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 132, 139 (2006) (reviewing the 
literature regarding the motivations of entrepreneurs in the face of uncertainty and offering the synthesis 
that entrepreneurs differ in their “willingness to bear perceived uncertainty”). 
 112 Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice 
Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 21–22 (1991). 
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uncertainty.113 And subsequently, Craig Fox and Amos Tversky found that 
a crucial factor in subjects’ confidence was that they were comparatively 
more or less informed about another option.114 In other words, uncertainty 
aversion exists when they are comparatively less ignorant about another 
event.115 
To be clear, the reason uncertainty produces an aversion is that 
subjects apparently consider the worst possible outcome and work to avoid 
it.116 One could argue that the precautionary principle is one iteration of 
such a response, wherein regulators presume a highly negative outcome in 
withholding approval.117 In the context of innovation, the worst possible 
outcome related to intellectual property might be that funds are spent, time 
is wasted and no rights are obtained. Considering that possibility, one who 
is averse to the relevant uncertainty or ambiguity might simply avoid the 
game. 
In a different stream of research on risk preferences (rather than 
uncertainty per se), there is evidence that people react more strongly to 
sunk costs or loss of ownership than they do to the potential for gain. 
Termed the “endowment effect,” it was articulated most prominently by 
Richard Thaler (but was conceptually present in earlier descriptions of loss 
aversion).118 In other words, once people have something, they fear losing it 
more than they value an equivalent gain.119 This phenomenon may be 
reflected in Caballero and Krishnamurthy’s work, where ownership of 
securities subsequently and surprisingly worth less fueled a retreat from 
investment.120 
By connecting the behavioral literature to the innovation problem, it is 
possible to finally define the aspects of uncertainty that are positive and 
 
 113 Id. at 22–23.  
 114 Craig Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q. J. ECON. 
585 (1995). 
 115 Id. at 599. 
 116 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 146–52 (2007) (describing the thought process 
generally as an application of the “maximin” principle in the face of uncertainty). 
 117 See Oren Perez, Precautionary Governance and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: A 
democratic Framework for Regulating Nanotechnology, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 29, 33–36 
(2010) (describing the theory in the context of regulation). But see Nabil I. Al-Najjar, A Bayesian 
Framework for the Precautionary Principle, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S337 (2015) (arguing that the 
precautionary principle can be fit into standard subjective expected utility analysis). 
 118 Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON BEHAVIOR & ORG. 
39, 44 (1980). See also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of 
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POLITICAL ECON. 1325, 1326–28 (1990) 
(describing the origin of the theory). 
 119 Thaler, supra note 118, at 44.  
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negative. When (1) an innovator has no competence and (2) sunk costs are 
affected, the impact is more likely to be negative. This is particularly true if 
an alternative path exists that will avoid the uncertainty (e.g., secrecy, in 
the context of invention). The issue can be more easily understood if 
depicted in a bi-matrix: 
 
FIG. 1: LEGAL OR REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY IMPACT 
 
On the other hand, where there is either some level of competence or 
there is no future impact on investments from a decision, it is reasonable to 
presume that some amount of strategic opportunity exists. This is where we 
find entrepreneurs engaging their “animal spirits.”121 A risk-taking firm or 
individual can leverage its partial knowledge or protection over lesser 
qualities of others. And finally, if neither incompetence nor ex post 
investment impact exists, there should be no uncertainty impact. A rule or 
regulation existing in the context should have literally no relevance to an 
innovator and will not dissuade any player from moving ahead. 
Even if policymakers do not entirely conceptualize the above 
behavioral matrix when setting up innovations systems, we do have a 
general idea that law and regulation moderate uncertainty. Essentially, we 
transform uncertainty into risk. This is particularly true in the innovation 
world, where patents especially can be viewed as uncertainty reduction 
mechanisms, or at least, this is the case when law and regulation is 
functioning properly. 
 
 121 KEYNES, supra note 101, at 161. 
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II. THE PROPER UNCERTAINTY ROLE OF LAW AND REGULATION 
In order to evaluate rising legal and regulatory uncertainty, it is 
important to acknowledge how our existing system attempts to manage the 
unknown. Given the fact that uncertainty or ambiguity has the potential to 
detract from desirable (and socially useful) innovative behavior, it is 
reasonable to have counteracting mechanisms in place that address relevant 
unknowns. But because not every uncertainty is problematic, we are 
selective to ensure that the opportunity for competition and profit is 
maintained. Moreover, the goal is often to transform the uncertainty or 
ambiguity to risk, such that there is an ascertainable set of future outcomes 
against which investments can be made. From this perspective, thoughtful 
innovation policy can be viewed as, essentially, tweaking the uncertainty 
reduction devices to provide optimal encouragement. 
This is not to suggest that all of the uncertainty reduction mechanisms 
described below were necessarily designed specifically for that purpose. 
They may have primary goals to benefit a particular group (for example, 
safety regulations that protect consumers). However, from the innovator’s 
perspective, they all function to provide some better understanding of the 
future such that the probabilities in moving ahead are more defined and 
incentives function. 
A. Patents Ideally Reduce the Innovator’s Uncertainty Problem 
Innovation incentives provide a particular uncertainty reduction means 
by clarifying the potential for return on investment for a successful 
invention.122 The function, from the behavioral point of view, is the 
reduction in uncertainty as to how the hard work and capital invested in 
creating something new will pay off.123 In the absence of incentives, 
innovators must be concerned that ideas will be appropriated by 
competitors who will free-ride off of their efforts, and the uncertainty for 
thwarting or delaying that competition may be enough to dissuade.124 
 
 122 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275–80 
(1977) (patents function by securing a return on investment). There have been various types employed 
over the years, from privileges to rewards to patent and similar exclusion devices. See, e.g., 
SCOTCHMER, supra note 2, at 3–13 (introduction co-authored with Stephen Maurer describing 
government manipulation of innovation among the ancient Greeks). 
 123 See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 287 (1986) (describing appropriability 
regimes). 
 124 DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW 
ECONOMIC HISTORY 154–55 (1973) (describing patents as a means of internalizing positive 
externalities); Kieff, supra note 29, at 717–22 (describing the use of property rights to avoid 
commercial unused because an innovator will be dissuaded from not being able to fully realize the 
rewards associated with an endeavor); Cf. Lemley, supra note 29, at 1046–50 (defending the existence 
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Essential to modern incentive structures is the idea of attribution to the 
creator—we care who is responsible at some level. In earlier times, 
ownership of information was not as clearly celebrated, and credit played a 
greater role in assigning blame when something went wrong.125 If a brick 
was poorly formed or a knife blade dangerously brittle, identifying the poor 
craftsman with the intent of punishment was a far greater reason for 
recognizing individual contributions.126 To be sure, poets and story-tellers 
were recognized individually, but not with the intent of giving them space 
to recapture the fruits of their efforts but rather to prevent plagiarism or 
promote accurate copying.127 
There is a broadening of focus, at least in European society, around 
the time of the Renaissance.128 At that point, the mere awarding of 
opportunities and privileges to favored individuals or guild members gave 
way to means for rewarding inventors.129An important reason for this was 
trade. As cities and regions traded more frequently, there was a more 
obvious advantage to those who could produce better products or utilize 
more efficient methods.130 Regions with such strong reputations gained 
wealth, as goods became more widely traded and competition became more 
robust.131 The emergence of more formal scientific thought and the 
rediscovery of the achievements of the ancient world seemed to coincide.132 
Among the earlier types of true invention incentive was that of contest 
and reward.133 This was particularly when some great problem presented 
 
of free-riding even in real property and explaining why some free-riding is not antithetical to 
intellectual property). 
 125 See Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 
265, 269–70 (1975) (describing the use of trademarks to establish a reputation for quality or assign 
blame). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship, “Intellectual Property,” and the Origin of Patents: 
Notes toward a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 846, 853–58 (1991). 
 128 To be sure, innovation continued from ancient times through the Renaissance, but political 
disintegration and economic depression had an effect on its reporting. Lynn White Jr., Technology and 
Innovation in the Middle Ages, 15 SPECULUM 141, 149–50 (1940). 
 129 Long, supra note 127, at 870–875; Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoter of 
Competition: The Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 
1273–75 (2012). 
 130 Long, supra note 127, at 870–875. 
 131 Id.; Carlo Marco Belfanti, Guilds, Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowledge 
Northern Italy during the Early Modern Age, 45 TECH. & CULTURE 569, 584–589 (2004) (describing 
changing trade dynamics).  
 132 See DAVID WOOTTON, THE INVENTION OF SCIENCE (2015); 
Shekhar Aiyar, Carl-Johan Dalgaard & Omer Moav, Technological Progress and Regress in Pre-
Industrial Times, 13 J. ECON. GROWTH 125, 127–28 (2008) (describing the phenomenon of 
technological regress and rediscovery at various point in history). 
 133 SCOTCHMER, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
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itself to a community.134 One of the most famous examples concerns the 
building in Florence, Italy of what was, at the time, the world’s largest free-
standing dome.135 The path to the successful construction of Florence’s 
cathedral was far from certain. It was not until 1418 that a viable solution 
was proposed by a genius sculptor, goldsmith and architect named Filippo 
Brunelleschi in response to a contest.136 It required a massive investment in 
time and intellectual effort and failure in such work was not uncommon in 
communities without access to architects so skilled.137 
Why did Brunelleschi, a man who was not so wealthy that he could 
afford to engage in such innovation as a dalliance, agree to move forward? 
The Opera of Santa Maria del Fiore held a contest, with the princely sum of 
200 florens offered as a reward for the inventor/architect whose design was 
chosen.138 Viewed from an uncertainty perspective, the money offered 
Brunelleschi some amount of financial security if he were willing to put off 
his other projects and business venture to dedicate a period of his life to 
finishing the Duomo. 
This story is worth considering because it gives some insight into the 
shortfalls of the reward system that eventually gave way to patents. 
Brunelleschi was famously concerned that the benefit from his work might 
cease with the reward payment if he secured no other protection.139 His 
typical solution was to rely on secrecy to ensure that he would remain 
sought after for such work, rather than someone who might copy his 
designs and techniques.140 However, during the building of the Duomo, 
Brunelleschi faced a logistics problem that required a solution that could 
not be kept secret due to its open nature. In order to ship massive amounts 
of marble from Carrera, he wanted a more advanced transport mode. Thus, 
Brunelleschi created a large, river going ship, called Il Badalone, and 
petitioned and received from the Signore di Firenze one of history’s first 
 
 134 Id. at 41–47 (describing various examples of great problems and how prize systems created 
incentives). 
 135 ROSS KING, BRUNELLESCHI’S DOME 3, 6–7 (2000); Timeline, OPERA DI SANTA MARIA DEL 
FIORE, https://operaduomo.firenze.it/en/history/timeline/centuries/1-13th-14th-centuries 
[https://perma.cc/CHB4-YCP7]. The dome, which would have none of the traditional buttresses that 
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Florence. KATHLEEN JAMES-CHAKRABORTY, ARCHITECTURE SINCE 1400 32–35 (2014).  
 136 See generally Frank D. Prager, Brunelleschi’s Inventions and the “Renewal of Roman Masonry 
Work”, 9 OSIRIS 457 (1950) (describing Brunelleschi’s techniques as modifications of Roman methods 
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 137 JAMES-CHAKRABORTY, supra note 135, at 34–36. 
 138 Id. at 32–33; KING, supra note 135, at 37.  
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patents on a new invention.141 It is apparent that contests, secrecy and guild 
protections were not sufficient to provide some certainty that Brunelleschi 
could privately appropriate the benefits of his invention. Thus, the patent 
was born. 
In contexts such as Florentine, Italy, as well as in the Venetian 
Republic, as detailed by Sichelman and O’Connor,142 the invention patent 
gained traction. As with modern patents, these early rights offered no 
guarantee of financial benefit. Rather, they offer the possibility of profit 
through market exclusion only if consumers or other relevant purchasers 
see value.143 Brunelleschi could hope only that his boat was so successful 
that others would seek him out for the right to use the invention.144 
To put it in the language of decision theory: from the perspective of 
the innovator, modern patent law creates institutions and rules that provide 
probability distributions that can be assessed in determining whether to 
proceed. Broadly speaking, they set forth a limited market exclusion 
system that can be valuable if the claimed invention is an important part of 
a commercialized product or service. Instead of the uncertainty of secrecy, 
first-mover advantage, branding or some other approach against the 
countermoves of competitors, patents provide the probability distribution 
associated with property rights.145 The impact is extended if one considers 
Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory as a distribution related to exploiting the 
invention through broader development.146 For example, Gans, Hsu and 
Stern demonstrated that resolving patent uncertainty fosters commercial 
relationships (e.g., licensing) necessary to expand the market for ideas.147 
Underlying the general notion of patent property right protection are 
the more defined and ascertainable probability distributions regarding 
obtaining a patent from a patent office and enforcing it though either 
contracting systems (licensing) or litigation (courts or administrative 
entities in some countries). Although not guaranteed to receive a patent, 
innovators can consider probabilities for outcomes within an understood 
prosecution system that has very detailed rules148 and known decision-
 
 141 KING, supra note 135, at 108–117. 
 142 Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 129. 
 143 Id. at 1274–78.  
 144 Unfortunately, the boat sank on its maiden voyage. KING, supra note 135, at 116–17.  
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 146 Kitch, supra note 122, at 271. 
 147 Joshua S. Gans, David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property 
Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays, 54 MGMT. SCI. 982, 994 (2008).  
 148 For example, prosecution is dictated by the voluminous Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
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makers. An applicant can estimate the likelihood of success given the field 
of invention, the effort put into a prior art search, the scope of the claims, 
etc.149 
Additionally, probability for success in enforcement can be generally 
determined with sufficient knowledge about the strength of the 
infringement case, as well as the potential for an invalidity determination.150 
This is not dissimilar from real property. Adam Mossoff implied in a work 
criticizing the scholarship that suggests patents and real property are 
incongruous that, in fact, data for real property trespass claims is likely to 
have similar attributes.151 It will show an enforcement distribution that has 
an ascertainable probability that is far from certain.152 
One of the better works implicitly highlighting the above points is 
Mark Lemely’s and Carl Shaprio’s Probabilistic Patents.153 In this piece, 
the authors discuss various aspects of the patent system that cannot be 
known by prospective patentees (or innovators) ex ante, using the term 
“uncertainties.”154 They describe such uncertainties inherent in prosecuting 
patents and being denied if the examiner finds the invention is not new or 
nonobvious.155 Further, they discuss the uncertainties in litigation and the 
possibility that some information will be discovered or some argument 
made that renders the patent invalid.156 But critically, it is obvious that 
Lemley and Shapiro are not talking about Knightian uncertainty or 
ambiguity, but rather risk. This is made clear by the fact that they further 
describe patents as a kind of “lottery ticket,” which is a type of risk with 
known probabilities (that may be stacked against the player, but still, are 
not ambiguous).157 This is something that an innovator should be able to 
address, and though society may wish to change the probabilities (e.g., by 
making the prosecution process more rigorous and less error prone158 or 
 
PROCEDURE §§ 1900–1920 (9th ed. 8th rev., 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html [https://perma.cc/686G-HBEC]. 
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eliminating the doctrine of “willful infringement” in litigation159), the 
potential for ambiguity or uncertainty aversion should not rise. 
Similarly, Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer have written on the benefits 
of some probability rather than certainty in patent enforcement as a means 
to attenuate patent power without creating significant invention 
disincentives.160 They suggest that permitting uncertainty and delay in 
patent enforcement determinations reduces deadweight loss by encouraging 
some competitors to risk infringement until a final judgment is rendered.161 
Although Ayres and Klemperer do not distinguish between risk and 
unascertainable uncertainty, it seems clear that by using the term 
“probabilistic” and including percentages of enforcement likelihood in their 
model, they are referring to the same kind of quantifiable risk as Lemley 
and Shapiro. Again, this is distinct from Knightian uncertainty or 
Ellsberg’s ambiguity. 
Two important points about the system’s ability to substitute 
probability for uncertainty are worth noting. First, the reduction in 
ambiguity is not dependent on the legal strength of the rights. In other 
words, if patent rights are revised prospectively to reduce protections—for 
example, by precluding enforcement of certain types of inventions162 or 
making injunctions more difficult to obtain163 would not necessarily create 
uncertainty or ambiguity. Patents and other incentive rules (including tax 
and funding structures, in addition to property) can be adjusted to provide 
greater or lesser incentives. It is entirely reasonable for a society to support 
one type of innovation, such as renewable energy, and reduce support for 
another type, such as coal production. All such a revision should change is 
the probability distribution for the innovator related to some aspect of 
patent ownership or enforcement. Even a retrospective revision, if it is clear 
and static, can allow an innovator to engage is analysis closer to risk 
assessment. Therefore, an argument in favor of preventing patent 
uncertainty is not an argument for increased patent strength, per se. Along 
the same lines of Coase’s analysis of property rights vs. liability,164 the 
transaction costs of uncertainty are what is relevant, not where the property 
boundaries are set. 
 
 159 See id. at 86. 
 160 Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation 
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 
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 162 See Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Medical Method Patents and the Fifth Amendment: Do the New 
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 163 eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
 164 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 56 J.L. & ECON. 837, 850–53 (1960).  
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Second, the uncertainty that is reduced for the innovator not only 
relates to his or her own potentially patentable invention, but also the 
potentially conflicting inventions of other innovators. Although one is 
unlikely to know the probability distribution for blocking patents that may 
arise, knowing how the system is set up for such blocking patents, 
including the mechanisms in place for contracting, enforcing and 
challenging related to such patents still reduces uncertainty. 
B. Additional Uncertainty Reduction Mechanisms Support Innovation 
The scope of uncertainty reduction related to innovation is broader 
than patents. One can identify many additional mechanisms by considering 
the attenuation of unknowns at different points in the innovation process. 
Obviously, uncertainties impact industries differently, and may be more or 
less relevant depending on whether the innovator is an individual or firm, 
as well as the geography in which the activity takes place. However, the 
general theme of a defined structure—a set of game rules, if you will—
rather than defined outcomes is present. Put another way, they are 
institutions: norms, traditions, and legal rules and regulations that regulate 
how individuals and groups interact.165 It has been noted that, “by reducing 
uncertainty and, thus, the amount of information needed for individual and 
collective action, institutions are fundamental building blocks in all 
societies.”166 
At the invention stage, one can imagine uncertainties regarding the 
funding for research and the firm, limitations on study materials and rules 
about handling, and sources of information to derive and solidify the 
creation. The uncertainty is partially alleviated by having systems in place 
for early stage funding in the form of venture capital, grants, as well as 
securities rules.167 Further, regulations regarding the appropriate use of 
data168 or materials169 also reduces uncertainty. 
At the development stage, collaborative relationships and supply chain 
sourcing becomes very important. The central nature of commitments 
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elevates contracts to the fore of uncertainty reducing tools.170 The ability of 
contracts to identify rights and responsibilities ensures the future will roll 
out along a particular path, or compensation will be available to account for 
the loss. In addition, understanding whether international conflict will add 
costs to materials171 or limit their availability172 is essential for making plans 
for the future. 
The implementation stage benefits from less uncertainty in the event 
of loss (insurance), marketing approval (regulation), and appropriate 
relationships (antitrust). And it is significantly easier to negotiate when 
uncertainty related to market exclusion—the ability to keep competitors 
away from assists—is reduced.173 This ability is critically linked to 
property. As Hernando De Soto described in his highly regarded book, The 
Mystery of Capital, property law serves an essential function in ensuring 
market actors can establish the economic potential of assets, integrate 
information, make assets fungible and protect transactions.174 The 
predictability of property law—which includes the social commitment to 
the system—reduces the costs of dealing with the extra-legal protection and 
underground transactions that must accompany informal ownership.175 
Knowing this protection exists permits innovators to allocate costs to other 
aspects. And, of course, the failure to protect existing property rights 
entails the classic problem of takings or expropriation of property.176 A firm 
is much less likely to invest in a manufacturing facility in a country in 
which such private property is subject to nationalization.177 As suggested 
above, the impact of reduced property incentives is relevant to innovators 
whether in the realm of physical or intellectual.178 
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Additionally, the general nature of stable legal rules is particularly 
important. Whether securities law, regulatory interpretations or 
patentability qualifications, uncertainty creeps into the system when stable 
interpretations do not exist.179 
III. CATEGORIZING NEW UNCERTAINTY 
Despite the existence of an apparently well-designed innovation 
incentive system, something has clearly gone wrong. As properly framed 
from a behavioral perspective, the problem of uncertainty should be overall 
reduced by modern patent law. Instead, there are complaints and concerns 
that innovators and firms are more confused than ever.180 Some even argue 
for abolishing patents altogether.181 Is there something institutionally 
misaligned in the system, or fundamentally corrupt? 
The simple answer is, intellectual property systems are, by their 
nature, dynamic.182 New uncertainties arise from new technologies and 
evolving societies. Patent systems must evolve. Early protection regimes 
focused on machines, but now they must envelop software and DNA.183 
However, uncertainty must be managed along with the change, lest 
additional unknowns arise that have a strong aversive effect. Gone 
sufficiently awry, the system itself may turn actors away from policies 
 
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 720 (2007) (arguing that patents 
are not only property, but constitutionally protected private property), with Lemley, supra note 29, at 
1053–55 (noting that intellectual property is largely concerned with an under compensation problem, 
whereas real property is a “response to allocative distortions resulting from scarcity”). This assessment 
is relevant even with a weaker definition of patent property. See Oil State Energy Svs., LLC v. Greene’s 
Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1377 (2018) (holding that patents convey only the specific form 
or property right known as a “public franchise”). 
 179 See D’Amato, supra note 28, at 6. In an interesting work differentiating between narrow rules 
and broad standards, John Duffy argues that the latter have been proven to be significantly more durable 
over time. John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 609, 638–39 (2009). Such a distinction should not change the present analysis, as stability is as 
important in applying standards as it is in setting forth defined rules.  
 180 See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text. 
 181 See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 3, 4–7 (2013) (presenting the case that no studies definitely establish that patent systems 
encourage productivity growth and suggesting that society might be better off without them). 
 182 See Hylton, supra note 17, at 1144–48 (describing dynamic uncertainties in the patent system 
that are influenced by the political economy of those with power desiring a change in the rules). 
 183 Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in the 
Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 784–96 (2008) (providing a historical perspective on the 
initial purpose of patent law as having a basis in the economic theories of the Enlightenment); Peter S. 
Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s 
Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1294–96 (2011) (reflecting on the narrow, physical limits of the original 
interpretation of “art” and natural principles under the patent act). 
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intended to generate societal benefits, like public disclosure of 
inventions.184 
Of course, every new uncertainty is not a mole that needs to be 
whacked. As discussed, innovation in the patent system inherently has 
unknowns, and some uncertainty is actually beneficial. So how do we know 
what areas to target? For example, how do we know if an innovator in the 
position of Francesco Pompei is frustrated by a particular uncertainty in the 
patent system or if he has simply lost his bet on an ascertainable probability 
of protection? One may presume that something other than increased risk is 
creating a problem, but what is the dividing line? A categorization legal 
and regulatory uncertainty is necessary to delineate issues for reform. 
Recall that two of the factors most likely to foster ambiguity or 
uncertainty aversion are a lack of competence about the nature of the future 
decision and the potential for that future decision to retroactively impact 
sunk costs or investments.185 Such a situation may exist when a decision 
involving a legal or regulatory problem must be made wherein an 
individual has no knowledge about a consequential future rule, but such a 
rule has the potential to impact retroactively impact an existing investment. 
In this situation, it is reasonable to prefer a path that may avoid the 
innovation (say, focusing on other innovations, prioritizing secrecy over 
patents, etc.). However, if either factor is not present, it is less likely that 
uncertainty aversion will occur. 
This situation exists quite prominently when a critical legal test—a 
rule that would normally establish the probability of an outcome—is not, 
and apparently will not, be set forth in sufficient detail or clarity to allow 
one to make an informed assessment.186 Perhaps a more concrete rule will 
be applied to the innovator at some point in the future, but there is no way 
to know initially what it will be. Essentially, the innovator has no way of 
predicting how the law will be decided by a court or agency. It is akin to 
buying a lottery ticket and not knowing how many numbers, or perhaps 
even letters, will be used to determine the winner. As De Soto described in 
the context of contracts and private property in the developing world, 
knowing that a property system will still exist and how it will work in the 
future is a very important factor.187 Although an endeavor may involve high 
 
 184 See Daniel R. Cahoy et al., Fracking Patents: The Emergence of Patents as Information-
Containment Tools in Shale Drilling, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279, 293–95 (2013) 
(describing the traditional disclosure role of patents); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 539, 546–54 (2009).  
 185 See FIG. 1 and accompanying text, supra at 25. 
 186 D’Amato, supra note 28, at 6. 
 187 DE SOTO, supra note 174, at 162–63. 
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risk, consistent rules are necessary to provide the grounding for properly 
evaluating that risk. 
Exacerbating the impact of the uncertainty is if the eventual clarity 
will come only after costs are sunk and some ownership is gained from an 
early use of the test. It would be as if an innovator were compelled to return 
the winnings from the lottery ticket after winning, when a second round 
simply changed the contest rules and mooted the earlier result. Applying 
the observation that people are averse to losing what they already 
possess,188 watching such a game play out could create a disincentive. 
Under such conditions, it would only be natural for an innovator to be 
inclined to choose another path with less uncertainty, even if the 
probabilities of success are low. 
If we add on top of this uncertainty the possibility that others will play 
the game and end up with rights that conflict with the innovator’s eventual 
products or services, the negative impact is even more enhanced. These are 
essentially random roadblocks placed in the way of innovators. Not only 
would one want to avoid the particular ambiguous protection path, but 
perhaps one would avoid participating in the field altogether. 
Uncertainty of exactly this sort exists in the context of the test for 
patentable subject matter in the United States. The fact that some confusion 
is finally shaking out of the system due to the growing number of 
decisions189 does not completely ameliorate the negative effects. An 
understanding of how this rule likely negatively impacted innovation 
choices versus other, less ambiguous rules, is instructive. On the other 
hand, uncertainty that exists in other legal contexts, such as obviousness 
standards and rules for fee shifting, does not create the same concerns. An 
understanding of how these examples fit in the investment/competency 
matrix offers an explanation for the distinction and provides a roadmap for 
reform. 
A. Investment Killing Uncertainty: Patentability 
Perhaps no other topic in patent law has elicited as much ink as the 
question of what can be patented. It obviously is important from a public 
policy standpoint, as a serious debate has raged regarding the extent to 
 
 188 See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.  
 189 Consider, for example, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s comprehensive spreadsheet of 
patent eligibility decisions, which lists the basic facts and outcomes of 107 Federal Circuit decisions 
decided since the Alice case. Chart of Subject Matter Eligibility Court Decisions, USPTO (Feb. 1, 
2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-sme_crt_dec.xlsx, available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility 
[https://perma.cc/XU4H-6UT9] (under the heading “Other materials”).  
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which particular technology advances are encouraged or discouraged with 
patents.190 And it is relevant to technology historians, who may look to the 
evolution of patenting to track the evolution of technology.191 However, it is 
arguably most important to those operating in innovation environments 
because it is the critical cutoff to this particular path for protection. 
Innovators may change their behavior and shift what they are doing 
depending on the availability of patent protection;192 thus, the rules are 
important. 
In recent years, uncertainty was injected into the test for patentability, 
and there has been significant consternation in the intellectual property 
community.193 Although issues have arisen in many countries (e.g., the 
patentability of software is debated in countries subject to the European 
Patent Office194), it has become a focal point of concern about the patent 
system in the United States. As a context for uncertainty impacts, it is 
useful to consider the U.S. specifically, but the comments below should be 
relevant in many other countries. 
Patentability issues arise in the U.S. patent system at two broad time 
periods. During the prosecution (agency process for initial patent 
examination), an objection as to appropriate subject matter can be raised by 
the examiner.195 An applicant has the opportunity to rebut, and if successful, 
may obtain a patent if all of the other hurdles related to novelty, 
 
 190 Two articles by Professor Risch humorously bookend the broad debate. Compare Michael 
Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008), with Michael 
Risch, Nothing Is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 45 (2015). In addition, seminal articles on particular 
technologies have contextualized the debate in many areas. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary 
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (biotechnology 
patents); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999) (business methods 
patents); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (software patents). Professors Burk and Lemley have 
discussed whether the question is inherently distinctive depending on the technology in question. See 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific? 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 
(2002). 
 191 See generally Gerardo Con Diaz, Embodied Software: Patents and the History of Software 
Development, 1946–1970, 37 IEEE ANNALS OF THE HIST. OF COMPUTING, no. 3, 2015, at 8 (arguing 
that the history of software patenting and embodied software are inseparable). 
 192 Czarnitzki & Toole, supra note 14, at 151–53 (arguing that if patents are available, certain 
uncertain paths become more viable).  
 193 For various references discussing patentable subject matter, see articles and text, supra note 19. 
Some practitioners have been so concerned that they have developed blogs to track the impact of 
subject matter uncertainty. See, e.g., BilskiBlog, FENWICK & WEST, 
https://www.bilskiblog.com/alicestorm/ [https://perma.cc/QA3B-2JG9]. 
 194 Susan Marsnik & Robert E. Thomas, Drawing a Line in the Patent Subject-Matter Sands: Does 
Europe Provide a Solution to the Software and Business Method Patent Problem?, 34 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 227, 227 (2011). 
 195 MPEP § 2103. 
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obviousness and proper disclosure are surmounted.196 The second time 
period is post-grant. A subject matter challenge may arise as a defense to 
infringement in litigation197 or during an agency review process,198 the 
nature of which depends on the timing. 
The test for patentability during either prosecution or post-issuance 
review is based in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which sets forth the categories of 
patentable inventions as “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter,” as well as improvements.199 That 
language is broad and longstanding,200 though the U.S. Patent Office has 
identified signals, device profiles and paradigms as being excluded by the 
literal language.201 The 2011 revisions to the Patent Act additionally 
excluded claims directed to human organisms.202 This plain statutory 
framework is broad and not tremendously controversial in what it cuts out. 
However, as early as the 1850s, the courts have read in additional 
restrictions that have been maintained through common law precedent.203 
O’Reilly v. Morse (1853) was an early articulation of the concept that 
patents claiming broad, preemptive concepts rather than inventions (in that 
case, electromagnetism) were not valid.204 In the ensuing years, there were 
occasional cases dealing with the need to demonstrate inventiveness, but it 
was not until the 1970s, alongside the increasing prominence of software, 
that restrictive doctrine truly began to take shape.205 Even then, a rejection 
or invalidation based on subject matter was still relatively rare until the 
Supreme Court outlined a much more general rule in a 2012 case, Mayo v. 
Prometheus.206 Considering claims involving a method of administering 
thiopurine, the Court declared that its precedents “insist that a process that 
 
 196 Id.  
 197 Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 78–81 
(2013) (describing the invalidity defense in court).  
 198 Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 278–82 (2016) (detailing 
the PTO’s systems of review after granting a patent: post-grant review, inter partes review, and covered 
business method review). 
 199 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 200 With the first Patent Act of 1790, Congress defined the subject matter of a U.S. patent as “any 
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or 
used.” Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
 201 MPEP § 2106.03. 
 202 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011). 
 203 LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; 
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive 
right.”). 
 204 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–20 (1853). 
 205 Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of 
Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1799–1801 (2014).  
 206 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
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focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a 
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ 
sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more 
than a patent upon the natural law itself.”207 
Following Mayo was the case that arguably is most responsible for the 
current uncertainty. This is, in part, because it disproportionately impacts 
important areas of technology, but primarily because of the unclear test it 
provided. In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank,208 the Supreme Court endeavored to 
resolve a truly confusing set of opinions accompanying a per curium result 
from an en banc hearing of the case at the Federal Circuit.209 The case 
involved patents for mitigating settlement risk through the use of a shadow 
record of accounts.210 In considering whether the claimed invention was too 
abstract, the Supreme Court drew upon its decision in Mayo to fashion 
what has become known as the Alice two-step.211 First, a court is to 
“determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible 
concept[s],” and second, a court must “consider the elements of each claim 
both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the 
additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-
eligible application.”212 Abandoning previous technical rules, Alice opened 
the patentability question to the uncertainty of either a court’s or fact-
finder’s determination of concepts like “abstract,” “transform” and 
“conventional.”213 
In the wake of Alice, practitioners, courts and the PTO have worked to 
put together a coherent outline of what this case requires. The PTO’s 
efforts are a good example of the uphill battle an interpreter faces. The 
agency has put forth several guidance documents that consist primarily of 
different examples of what seems to be eligible and what is not based on 
 
 207 Id. at 72–73.  
 208 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 209 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 210 This invention is well represented in one of the patents termed “representative” by the Court. 
U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (issued Oct. 19, 1999). 
 211 Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217–22. 
 212 Id. at 217. 
 213 See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366–68 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (describing prior 
cases where the court found an invention to be abstract and noting the fact-finder’s role in determining 
what constitutes routine or conventional activity insufficient to transform an invention into something 
more). The complexity of the post-Alice analysis was noted in a concurrence to the Federal Circuit’s 
denial of an en banc rehearing of the Berkheimer decision. 890 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(Lourie, J., concurring) (“We now are interpreting what began, when it rarely arose, as a simple § 101 
analysis, as a complicated multiple-step consideration of inventiveness (‘something more’), with the 
result that an increasing amount of inventive research is no longer subject to patent.”).  
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court decisions.214 Most illustrative are the PTO’s charts of decisions 
holding claims eligible215 and overall subject matter eligibility decisions.216 
Thus, the best one can do is try to match an invention after reviewing all of 
the examples and hope a court finds a similar connection. This is a task that 
is difficult for an attorney, let alone a lay innovator. During a December 
2016 Roundtable held by the USPTO, Mark Lemley summed up the 
challenge. He noted that the inherent style of “analogic reasoning” is 
problematic for non-lawyers because “it doesn’t provide us with 
particularly useful rules.”217 Rather, it appears “[w]e’re doing it by looking 
at a kind of estimate of how technological the invention is.”218 Professor 
Lemley pointed out that the courts do in the end seem to be getting to the 
right point from a policy perspective,219 but this does not dispel the ex-ante 
uncertainty faced by an innovator. 
To be sure, there is a reasonable debate on how broad subject matter 
should be. The Committee Report accompanying the 1952 Patent Act 
suggests that Congress intended patentable subject matter to include 
“anything under the sun that is made by man[.]”220 But others have argued 
that patents need to be constrained to avoid an excess of monopoly power 
or preemption.221 Perhaps Alice and subsequent precedent have simply 
moved the line to something more restrictive. How do we know that 
patentability analysis presents an uncertainty problem rather than a new 
choice for more narrow standards? 
The simplest indication that the post-Alice world is uncertain is that 
similar types of inventions are treated differently depending on how a 
particular court (or appellate panel) views either abstraction or additional 
inventive activity. The example of Francesco Pompei’s patents presents a 
case in point. A patent applicant or owner does not know what standards 
will apply and how those might fit with earlier arguments the innovator 
 
 214 Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-
regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility [https://perma.cc/XU4H-6UT9]. 
 215 Decisions holding claims eligible, USPTO (July 23, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-
and-regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility [https://perma.cc/XU4H-6UT9] (under 
the heading “Other materials”). 
 216 Chart of Subject Matter Eligibility Court Decisions, supra note 189.  
 217 Roundtable on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO, 50 (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/RT2%20Transcript%20FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3SP-MBCX]. 
 218 Id. at 50–51. 
 219 Id. at 49. 
 220 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 44 (1952). 
 221 See Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH L. REV. 
1858, 1862–73 (2014) (describing economic theories for limiting patentable subject matter, though 
ultimately concluding an underlying moral basis underlies rejections).  
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may have made. At the 2016 USPTO Roundtable, Marian Underweiser of 
IBM stated about the patentability jurisprudence: 
These cases use an [ends-justify-the-means] analysis and they are thus 
inconsistent with each other and provide no reliable rules that can be used to 
predict outcomes going forward. 
This is the hallmark of failed jurisprudence. Judges have no faith that applying 
the test will yield what they believe should be the proper outcome, so they 
bend the test to suit their desired result. Step two becomes step one, 
preemption matters, and then it doesn’t. 
This is judicial anarchy aimed directly at groundbreaking technology.222 
This is not simply a complaint that the standards are too narrow, but 
specifically that they are undeterminable. Importantly, this is uncertainty in 
the words of an innovator. 
Even the judiciary sees an uncertainty problem as they attempt to 
apply responsible doctrine in patent cases. Writing in dissent in a recent 
infringement case involving a patent covering a manager for unused 
capacity of a display device, Judge Plager stated, “There is little consensus 
among trial judges (or appellate judges for that matter) regarding whether a 
particular case will prove to have a patent with claims directed to an 
abstract idea, and if so, whether there is an “inventive concept” in the 
patent to save it.”223 This view is openly shared by colleagues such as Judge 
Linn224 and Judge Lourie.225 
Objectively, as well, is the evidence that there are swings in subject 
matter standards that seem based on individual whims rather than 
comprehensive policy. There is the fact that the courts have not been 
consistent in identifying the source of the rules, at times acting as 
textualists and looking to the breadth of the statute as opposed to finding 
common law restriction.226 More directly, there is the fact that subject 
matter substantially increased as a basis of rejection in both litigation and 
Patent office proceedings in certain arts (such as e-commerce) after Alice.227 
 
 222 Roundtable on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, supra note 217, at 406–07. 
 223 Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 224 Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Linn, 
D., dissenting) (declaring that the Supreme Court’s subject matter test is “indeterminate and often leads 
to arbitrary results”). 
 225 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Lourie, A., concurring) (stating 
that patent eligibility law “needs clarification by a higher authority, perhaps by Congress”).  
 226 Duffy, supra note 179, at 622. 
 227 See Mark Nowotarski, Surviving Alice in the E-Commerce Arts, 
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/05/surviving-alice-in-the-e-commerce-arts.html 
[https://perma.cc/6S6W-XTZW] (chart showing allowance rates in work groups 3620 and 3680 dipping 
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Attempts at reform to reduce § 101 uncertainty is, of course, on the 
policy table. Under Director Iancu, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
issued new guidelines that attempt to cabin the analysis somewhat.228 
However, there is no guarantee that this analysis will be reflected by the 
courts because it is not binding.229 Still, indications are that rejections in the 
PTO have decreased since Director Iancu’s appointment.230 In addition, 
Senator Christopher Coons and Thom Tillis have circulated draft 
legislation that would eliminate “implicit or other judicially created 
exceptions to subject matter eligibility,” leaving the courts to rely on the 
text of the statute and the U.S. Constitution as the only limitation.231 
However, there is opposition to such reform, and it is unclear whether 
uncertainty will actually be impacted by a change to the Patent Act.232 
What all of this means from the perspective of innovators in certain 
fields, such as software and life sciences, is that patentable subject matter is 
 
by over 60% post-Alice); Colleen Chien & Jiun Ying Wu, Decoding Patentable Subject Matter, 2018 
PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 1, 17 (2018) (“On balance, the data confirm that 101 is playing an 
increasingly important role in the examination of software and medical diagnostics patents.”). 
 228 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 53 (Jan. 7, 2019). 
The guidance limits the potential for inventions to be found “abstract” by enumerating categories of 
abstract concepts and stating that a rejection should follow only if the invention is “directed to” the 
concept. 
 229 See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 Fed. Appx. 1013, 1020 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“While we greatly respect the PTO’s expertise on all matters relating to 
patentability, including patent eligibility, we are not bound by its guidance.”). 
 230 See Dennis Crouch, Updates from USPTO Public Meeting from Aug 2, 2018, PATENTLY-O 
(Aug. 2, 2018) https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/08/updates-from-uspto-public-meeting-from-aug-2-
2018.html [https://perma.cc/3NQH-NRKS] (reporting updates from public meeting showing that under 
Director Iancu, eligibility rejections have dropped from 8% to 6.6% of all rejections).  
 231 On May 22, 2019, a bipartisan, bicameral bill was proposed which could redefine what kinds of 
inventions may be patented. If enacted, the bill will remove the judicial exceptions to patent eligibility. 
This draft bill arrives on the heels of the USPTO’s revised guidance on patent eligibility that went into 
effect on January 7, 2019 and feedback from stakeholders, inventors, and industry representatives from 
an earlier draft in April. Thom Tillis, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers 
Release Draft Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act, 
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-
draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act [https://perma.cc/669Q-PVYU] (effectively 
abrogating any judicially created exception to patent-eligibility, and thereby, overturning the Mayo, 
Myriad, and Alice decisions).  
 232 See Shubha Ghosh, A Fitter Statute for the Common Law of Patents, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 1, 
2019) https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/08/fitter-statute-patents.html [https://perma.cc/QU3V-Y548] 
(describing opposition from the ACLU and several other organizations as well as constitutional 
concerns with constricting the power of courts to create common law exceptions to patent eligibility); 
see also Dennis Crouch, Confusing a Stylized H, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 4, 2019), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent?w=31 [https://perma.cc/UZ2F-9FMF] (arguing that the draft not only fails 
to resolve any of the issues it purports to resolve, but also, it likely will take the state of the U.S. patent 
system to a time of even greater uncertainty regarding patent eligibility and arguing that defining 
“useful” to include essentially any invention or discovery that was developed through human 
intervention will likely reinvigorate the argument that human genes are patent-eligible). 
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an uncertainty minefield. Importantly, it does not matter if, as Professor 
Lemley suggested, we can determine post-hoc that courts seem to be 
making policy-aligned, or well-reasoned decisions. If an innovator has no 
basis for assessing the future probabilities of that “right” decision, it does 
not resolve the uncertainty. 
Put in terms of uncertainty impact, the current state of patentable 
subject matter is an issue on which innovators have little to no competence, 
yet the future determination will certain impact investment in the future 
(see Figure 2). 
 
FIG. 2: IMPACT OF CURRENT PATENT UNCERTAINTY 
 
Therefore, it would be appropriate to categorize subject matter 
uncertainty as highly problematic, and very ripe for reform. 
B. If-Then Uncertainty: Obviousness 
If extant uncertainty imposed upon otherwise informed inventors 
elicits concern, substantially less sympathetic is the innovator that creates 
his or her own uncertainty. If such an individual has the option of a 
relatively safe and more predictable path, but instead voluntarily moves in 
a direction with unascertainable probabilities, this “if, then”233 uncertainty 
seems self-imposed. Particularly if the innovator has made such a choice 
 
 233 The “if, then” statement is a concept in conditional or rule-based computer programming 
languages. See Frederick Hayes-Roth, Rule-Based Systems, 28 COMM. OF THE ACM 921, 922–23 
(1985) (containing examples of “if, then” programming language). It tells the computer to take a path 
“if” certain conditions are met. It is used here as an analogy: if an innovator makes choices that create 
certain conditions, then that innovator can expect more or less uncertainty. 
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for the potential of great gain, we have less of a societal inclination to offer 
more protection, as the adoption of enhanced uncertainty was self-imposed. 
In fact, this is exactly the kind of inclination toward unknown futures that 
Knight noted should be rewarded by his definition of “profit.”234 With the 
choice factor, such uncertainty is not negative in its impact on incentives 
for the innovation process; winners and losers are likely willing to accept 
their fates similar to a casino gambler. 
A straightforward example of “if, then” uncertainty exists in the law 
of patent non-obviousness or inventive step. This is a patentability standard 
that ensures an invention constitutes a significant enough technological 
contribution to deserve rights of exclusion.235 In U.S. patent law, Section 
103 of the Patent Act requires rejection if the “differences between 
the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed 
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the [application’s] 
effective filing date [ . . . ] .”236 Essentially, the law ensures that trivial 
advances that are merely predictable variations in existing technology, 
judged from the viewpoint of those of ordinary skill in the art, are 
considered part of the public domain and not subject to capture.237 Non-
obviousness exists separately from subject matter as a requirement, and has 
traditionally been important in erecting a barrier to “bad” patents.238 
The assessment of non-obviousness is made with reference to the 
patent application’s claims.239 The reviewing body (Patent Office or court) 
considers all of the available prior art and determines whether the 
combination renders the claimed invention obvious.240 To make a prima 
facie case of such obviousness, there must be a motivation to combine the 
teachings of the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.241 Without such 
a motivation, it is too easy to combine disparate ideas that no inventor 
 
 234 KNIGHT, supra note 55, at 271. 
 235 Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 
16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 715–16 (2013). 
 236 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 237 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); Merges, supra note 149, at 12–14. 
The ideal outcome of the obviousness requirement is that we will be less likely to grant rights to 
inventions that would have been created even in the absence of the patent incentive. See generally 
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L. J. 1590 
(2011) (making the case that the “inducement standard” should be even more emphasized in the law). 
 238 See Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2067–69 (2007) (detailing the reputed 
link between obviousness and patent quality). 
 239 MPEP § 2141; Merges, supra note 149, at 18. 
 240 MPEP § 2141. 
 241 Insite Vision Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 783 F.3d 853, 859 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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would reasonably consider or otherwise engage in hindsight analysis.242 But 
how to judge this motivation is an inherently difficult problem that has 
evolved over the years.243 In the last part of the 20th century, the Federal 
Circuit engaged in an effort to add certainty to the analysis by creating the 
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation test” (“TSM test”), which required 
evidence of a reason to combine references.244 The Federal Circuit’s efforts 
were ultimately undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., which tossed out the TSM test as the sole 
measure of whether one of ordinary skill in the art would combine 
references.245 The KSR decision opened up the sources that a reviewing 
body can use to find the motivation to combine, and left more discretion to 
the district court.246 
Due to the renewed flexibility in the obviousness analysis, there is 
now more uncertainty in predicting future outcomes.247 But, importantly, 
this does not necessarily mean that innovators will be more disinclined to 
patent. When it comes to claims that are likely to raise an obviousness 
issue, the patent applicant actually has a great deal of control. It is a 
fundamental understanding of claim drafting that the applicant’s language 
determines the scope of the grant.248 A prospective patentee can choose 
broad claims that are likely to include more prior art and trigger an 
obviousness challenge, or narrow claims that could be untouched but have 
a more limited scope of protection.249 The reward for broad claims is, of 
course, more patent protection. Therefore, if a patent applicant makes the 
choice to reach for more exclusionary power, the additional uncertainty he 
 
 242 Id.  
 243 See Rantanen, supra note 235, at 717–22 (providing an overview of obviousness jurisprudence). 
 244 See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (detailing standard and accompanying rationale), abrogated on other grounds. 
 245 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). The Court’s decision corrected the 
Federal Circuit’s overly rigid test from a philosophical standpoint, but also responded to complaints that 
the TSM test made it too likely that bad patents would issue. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 
238, at 2064–65 (noting criticism of the Federal Circuit’s test, including in recent reports on the state of 
the U.S. patent system).  
 246 Rantanen, supra note 235, at 721–22 (noting that the exact boundaries of the resulting test are 
not clear). 
 247 See, e.g., Adam Powell KSR Fallout: Questions of Law Based on Finding of Fact and the 
Continuing Problem of Hindsight Bias, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 243, 246–50 (2009) (asserting 
that the Supreme Court injected more uncertainty into the determination by introducing a more flexible 
standard to be applied by district courts). 
 248 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 848–49 (1990) (observing that a patentee will claim something broader than a 
specific form disclosed in an invention, though the practice is limited at its outer boundaries by the 
enablement doctrine). 
 249 Id. at 845–49 (describing the implications of choosing broad versus narrow claims). 
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or she faces might be a reasonable exchange. It may even be welcome in 
that risk averse competitors will be disincentivized. 
Framing this within the impact bi-matrix described above250, we would 
say that the uncertainty in obviousness would create less of an aversion 
because the applicant has competence about the innovative quality of the 
invention (see Figure 2). Such competence may be bolstered by the 
development of so-called “secondary considerations,” which establish that 
the invention enjoyed commercial success, satisfied a long-felt need or 
solved a problem that others could not.251 Even if there is the potential for 
impact subsequent to significant investment (e.g., when a court considers 
obviousness in a litigation), the impact is likely to be substantially less than 
an unpredictable subject matter knock-out. 
With this view in mind, policymakers should not attempt to eliminate 
all uncertainty in obviousness determinations. Not only is it unlikely to be a 
disincentive to invent, but it may actually propel the most innovative. 
Although the test can drift to total unpredictability, as it stands, 
obviousness uncertainty is an important opportunity for Knightian profit. 
C. Remedial Uncertainty: Fee-Shifting 
Even if one accepts that uncertainty is not always negative and can 
offer opportunities to savvy innovators, one might ask whether it ever can 
have overall positive effects. In other words, are there sources of 
uncertainty that can be said to promote innovative behavior, regardless of 
risk preferences? If such sources disincentivize bad behavior that thwarts 
innovation, the answer is yes. When rules can be gamed by the 
unscrupulous, ambiguous standards for punishment may reduce the 
temptation to test the system as one can never determine for certain when 
the hammer will fall. If this uncertainty does not conflict with the 
competence/investment framework above, it is reasonable to assume the 
overall effect is positive. The concept of such good uncertainty is perfectly 
illustrated by the law of fee-shifting in U.S. patent litigation. 
Fee shifting is a mechanism that exists in patent and other forms of 
intellectual property litigation that upends the traditional system of 
allocating costs in order to punish a party that has engaged in bad behavior. 
The traditional expense allocation in the U.S., as with other civil contexts, 
is the “American Rule,” which states that each side pays its own costs.252 
 
 250 See FIG 2. 
 251 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 252 See Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (“Our basic point of 
reference when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the 
American Rule: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract 
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This is in contrast to the so-called, “English Rule,” common outside the 
United States, which mandates that the loser pay the winner’s costs.253 Also 
known as “fee shifting,” the English Rule exists as a principle of fairness 
and way to ensure that the expense of litigation does not subsume the 
benefit of winning.254 Conversely, the American Rule is more policy driven, 
serving as an economic tool for encouraging legitimate, but close lawsuits 
that might otherwise be forgone if one faced the risk of accounting for the 
other side’s costs.255 
U.S. courts have long-imposed the English Rule of fee shifting as a 
punishment in a variety of litigation contexts.256 This is particularly true in 
intellectual property law.257 In patent law, fee-shifting was codified in 
1946258 and incorporated in a revised form in the Patent Act of 1952.259 The 
current rule, Section 285, states that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may 
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”260 It has been left to 
the courts to define “exceptional,” but it has been traditionally applied in 
cases where either the plaintiff brings an infringement litigation in “bad 
faith” and without proper basis, or where a defendant engaged in willful 
infringement.261 
 
provides otherwise.” (internal quotations omitted)). See generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of 
the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1984) 
[https://perma.cc/67FV-JR5A].  
 253 Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 46–47 (1984). 
 254 Id. 
 255 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (The 
American Rule promotes broad access to the courts by not penalizing a party “for merely defending or 
prosecuting a lawsuit.”).  
 256 For a comprehensive review of the legislative history of patent fee shifting, see Daniel R. Cahoy 
& Lynda J. Oswald, A Serendipitous Experiment in Percolation of Intellectual Property Doctrine, 95 
IND. L. J. (forthcoming 2019). See also John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: 
The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1588 (1993); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, 
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES (4th ed. 2012). 
 257 For example, the Copyright Act allows for fee shifting in a fairly broad set of cases. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 505 (2012) (“In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of 
full costs by or against any party other than the United State or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise 
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as 
part of the costs.”). Fee shifting is also explicitly permitted in patent, federal trade secret, and federal 
trademark contexts as well. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (addressing fee-shifting in trademark actions); 
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D) (2012) (addressing fee-shifting in civil trade secret misappropriation 
actions); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (addressing fee-shifting in patent actions). 
 258 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946). 
 259 Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–
376). 
 260 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).  
 261 See Cahoy & Oswald, supra note 256. 
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The key uncertainty factor in fee shifting arises from the fact that bad 
actors cannot fully predict when it will catch and penalize them.262 Because 
a court has the discretion to determine if a certain act is exceptional, a party 
has an incentive to behave, lest their actions be fit to the statutory language. 
The flexibility telegraphs that the test will be outcome determinative. 
Conversely, if a party had a strong sense of exactly what type of behavior 
would trigger fee shifting, that party could push the boundaries. It could 
engage in problematic behavior up to the point of penalty. In the end, 
uncertainty is a threat that compels a party to err on the side of respectful 
behavior. In turn, this promotes innovation, because market actors can be 
more assured that litigation will serve as an appropriate vehicle for 
addressing disputes, rather than a sword for those who would manipulate 
the system.263 
To see that the above narrative is more than theoretical, consider that 
there has actually been an opportunity to observe how uncertainty in fee 
shifting positively impacts the innovation environment. The fee shifting 
statute in the Patent Act had been interpreted with a level of flexibility and 
deference by the courts since its enactment through the creation of the 
Federal Circuit in 1982.264 A variety of circumstances could qualify as 
exceptional under the law.265 That flexibility ended with the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., in 
which the court determined that fee shifting could be applied outside of 
litigation misconduct only when the case was both (1) brought in 
“subjective bad faith,” and (2) “objectively baseless.266 This had the effect 
of severely narrowing the types of cases subject to the rule, and rendered it 
a relatively empty threat. As a result, fee-shifting awards were quite rare.267 
Concurrently, concerns about abuse of the patent system from 
frivolous litigations brought by so-called, “patent assertion entities,” 
arose.268 Some openly flouted a negative litigation model, in which low 
quality patents were asserted against financially weak defendants for 
 
 262 Douglas Y’Barbo, On Fee-Shifting and the Protection of Copyright, 44 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 23, 54–55 (1996) (noting that uncertain fee-shifting schemes can impact litigation behavior).  
 263 Moreover, uncertainty will dissuade those with weak cases from litigating in the first place, 
potentially reducing litigation overall. D’Amato, supra note 28, at 16–17. 
 264 See Cahoy & Oswald, supra note 256, at 23. 
 265 Id. at 21. 
 266 Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailer Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 267 Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 325, 377 (2012) (finding 
that between 2005 and 2011, fee-shifting awards were granted in 56 cases per year out of 3000 patent 
cases filings per year). 
 268 Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald, Complexity and Idiosyncrasy at the Federal Circuit, 19 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 216, 238–39 (2018). 
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nuisance settlements.269 Although one might be inclined to challenge such 
behavior, the Federal Circuit’s narrow interpretation of Section 285 
ensured that fee-shifting would not be the available mechanism. In essence, 
the fact that a statutorily broad and ill-defined rule was curtailed reduced 
the uncertainty that would have otherwise disincentivized bad behavior. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reinvigorated the beneficial uncertainty in 
two paired cases: Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,270 
and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc.271 In 
Octane Fitness, the Court found that the Federal Circuit’s test was “rigid 
and mechanical” in a way that belied the intent of the statute.272 Instead, the 
Court held that the term “exceptional” was to be interpreted according to its 
ordinary meaning, which meant that the case simply “stood out from 
others.” In Highmark, the Court followed up with the holding that a district 
court’s finding on exceptionality could be reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion.273 In the wake of the Octane and Highmark cases, fee shifting 
awards rose significantly.274 
The behavioral result of the Supreme Court’s stripping down of fee 
shifting doctrine to a district court’s interpretation of the term 
“exceptional” is the creation of an effective deterrent; a litigant cannot fully 
know what kind of bad behavior will fit and will be more cautious. 
Although there are some acts that are more likely to fit, such as willful 
infringement,275 the outer boundaries are unclear. The uncertainty in the test 
creates an incentive to avoid any allegation that behavior creates an 
exceptional case. And the less abusive the litigation system is, the more 
innovators will believe it serves a legitimate enforcement function that is 
safe to interact with. In the context of fee shifting, uncertainty enhances the 
remedial purpose of the law. Conversely, uncertainty in fee shifting does 
not create aversion because it relates to acts that are in the impacted 
litigant’s control, implying competency. Also, the uncertainty arises in 
 
 269 See, e.g., David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES, July 
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 270 See generally, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc, 572 U.S. 545 (2014). 
 271 See generally, Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559 (2014). 
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 272 Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 550. 
 273 Id. at 554. 
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close proximity to the acts that trigger it (litigation behavior). Innovation-
friendly policy and no aversion equates to a positive effect.276 
Thus, a behavioral perspective on intellectual property fee-shifting 
uncertainty suggests that reform is not only unnecessary, it could have a 
broadly negative impact on innovation. So long as the uncertainty does not 
stray beyond capturing bad behavior, it is positive. 
IV. ADDRESSING PATENT UNCERTAINTY 
Once “investment-killing” uncertainty in the law is identified, as in 
the case of patentable subject matter, policymakers and innovators have 
available several possible avenues of response. The easiest is to refrain 
from action, and simply permit negative impacts to reduce the power of 
incentive systems like patents to induce innovative behavior. Another is to 
undertake direct legal or regulatory action to eliminate or substantially 
reform the uncertain rule. Finally, society can place the burden on firms to 
use internal capacities to foresee and prepare resources to confront or 
capture opportunities. In the real world, some combination of all of these 
responses will take place. But society’s strongest hand is with direct legal 
and regulatory revision, and such action should be considered when 
important innovation is most likely to be affected. 
A. Uncertainty Aversion Should Not Substitute for Innovation Policy 
Do nothing is always the easy option. And in the case of patent 
incentives, there is an arguable justification. If the above uncertainty 
simply weakens patent rights, innovators will be pushed toward other 
choices like secrecy.277 Those who believe that the patent system does not 
make a positive contribution278 may find this is one way of reducing its 
influence. This, however, appears to be the minority position. 
More realistically, it is possible to consider the effect of uncertainty 
aversion on innovative behavior as merely one of a number of possible 
policy levers that are constantly being pulled.279 The most explicit might be 
patent and trademark fees in the United States, which are progressive and 
provide significant breaks for “micro entities” and “small entities.”280 Such 
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fee delineations clearly make it easier for some to obtain rights more than 
others, and this policy probably shapes innovation in some way. The same 
should be true for any differential expense that treats certain inventions or 
individuals differently. How is uncertainty or ambiguity different? 
Theoretically, it could be just another lever. 
The primary distinction is that unascertainable uncertainty is a 
scattershot approach. It is not directed policy and has unknown and 
unintended effects. It is possible that it will impact some slice of innovation 
that would have otherwise ended up being critical for some future field. 
Although explicitly picking winners and losers in the innovation game 
through policy is dangerously presumptive,281 at least stakeholders 
generally have some ability to participate in the debate (such as in the 
federal rulemaking context282). If not explicit, then we may trust the market 
and the wisdom of the consumers.283 However, viewed as irrational decision 
making, uncertainty aversion has none of these intended benefits. 
At its most base level, aversion is a cost that may simply end up as a 
blunt penalty on those with more limited funding. There is recent research 
indicating that in concentrated industries, patent ownership is shifting to 
larger firms.284 One explanation is that these firms are increasingly better 
innovators, and there are technical barriers to entry.285 But a contributing 
factor might be that small innovators in ambiguously protected industries 
are averse to inventing or commercializing inventions. Such an impact may 
mean that innovation of particular interest to small entities may be 
decreased. 
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B. Legal and Regulatory Revision with Care 
The revision route is intensive in terms of political expense,286 but it 
has the greatest potential for reducing negative uncertainty impacts. If one 
can focus specifically on what aspect is uncertain, reform may be possible 
that restores the proper role of intellectual property rights. Such an effort 
requires broad participation from stakeholders and negotiation.287 But the 
resulting rules may be clearer and more broadly acceptable than those 
generated by courts that prioritize doctrinal consistency and conservative 
statutory interpretation. 
Of course, there are significant risks to reform as well. It is possible 
that any revision will not sufficiently resolve uncertainty problems or even 
raise new ones. To be sure, if a bright line is set, the Coasian argument is 
that efficiency will result if obstacles to bargaining are sufficiently low.288 
But setting that bright line is much easier in theory than in practice. 
Perhaps the only way to avoid this is to cut a problematic rule, either in 
effect or in total. 
This can happen at the administrative level.289 Taking patentable 
subject matter as an example, the U.S. intellectual property community has 
watched with some relief as Director Iancu took steps in 2018 to 
deemphasize section 101 considerations in many patent cases. In remarks 
delivered at the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) 46th 
Annual meeting, Director Iancu stated the PTO had crafted guidance that 
would eliminate section 101 considerations in many cases.290 That guidance 
issued in 2019.291 Specifically, the PTO will not find a claim abstract unless 
it is “directed to” one of three categories: mathematical concepts, certain 
methods of organizing human interactions, and mental processes.292 Even if 
a claim references one of the three categories, it is not directed to one if it 
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integrates it into a practical application.293 By cutting off the possibility of a 
subject matter analysis for some percentage of cases, the potential for 
uncertain results is greatly reduced. 
A stronger reform would be to rewrite or curtail an uncertain rule so 
as to eliminate the possibility that any connected, uncertain assessment 
would be imposed. Again, with regard to patentable subject matter, there 
are many legislative proposals that would eviscerate section 101. A 
prominent example is the so-called, “Coons-Tillis draft bill,” which would 
add a definition of “useful” that requires “human intervention” and 
eliminate “judicially created exceptions to subject matter eligibility.”294 
Such a change, if enacted, would abrogate the uncertain case law resulting 
from the Alice decision. 
Broadly eliminating an uncertain rule or law can obviously have 
negative innovation consequences if the rule provides some important 
standard that is necessary for the efficient functioning of the system. 
Policymakers must exercise caution, and perhaps consider the lightest hand 
possible in changing the rules. Even in the context of patentable subject 
matter, it can be argued that rigorous section 101 analysis prevents some 
bad patents from issuing.295 The fact is, other patentability standards—
novelty, non-obviousness, enablement, etc.296—remain in place to serve as 
a barrier to make reduction of 101 less problematic. But the debate on the 
impact of revision on overall innovation policy is critical.297 
C. Firms Must Develop Internal Competencies to Identify and Ameliorate 
Uncertainty 
Regardless of what does or does not happen at the level of legislative 
or administrative reform, firms should prepare. As the literature evinces, 
some firms are able to innovate in the face of uncertainty or ambiguity and 
others are slowed.298 The successful firms seem to be capable of strategic 
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foresight beyond that of their competitors. An ideal system of uncertainty 
management should support and encourage firm action. 
At least two approaches appear to be important in moderating negative 
uncertainties: (1) creating a structure that is capable of flexibly responding 
to a variety of unknowns; and (2) investing in the production of additional 
information. Unfortunately, these options are generally resource-intensive. 
As a result, it may be that in innovation contexts, harmful uncertainties 
have a greater impact on individuals or small firms. 
A well-regarded management process originating from the U.S. 
military is the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA) 
framework.299 Emerging from the aftermath of World War II, when the 
military was compelled to take on a more complex role amidst a rapidly 
changing global political environment, VUCA provided a strategic tool for 
risk management.300 Essentially, VUCA is a risk and uncertainty 
identification tool that aids in the analysis of future events.301 It provides 
perspective on the potential pitfalls of particular actions and theoretically 
permits more informed decision making and preparation.302 Theoretically, 
VUCA-like analysis should be useful to entrepreneurs.303 As noted above, 
the more information one has, the less likely one will be dissuaded by 
uncertainties. 
A different technique has been promoted by many, including the 
RAND Corporation, for addressing deep factual uncertainties such as the 
impact of climate change.304 In situations where the underlying mechanisms 
of future events are so poorly understood, there is utility in conceiving of 
multiple future realities and planning against them. This is the idea 
underlying the scenario building.305 By playing out multiple futures, more 
valuable or consequential paths can be identified.306 Scenario building has 
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been suggested in the context of product innovation307 and intellectual 
property regimes.308 
Although VUCA and scenario building exercises provide useful 
mechanisms for generating more information, to actually deal with 
uncertainty, the integration of a flexible adaptation system may be 
necessary. David Teece has written extensively on the topic of innovation 
and is known for his work elucidating the characteristics of firms that are 
better able to compete in the marketplace.309 He noted that flexibility in 
resource allocation and the ability to respond to unexpected situations is 
important for success.310 Teece refers to these attributes as “dynamic 
capabilities,” which he categorizes as those directed to “sensing, seizing 
and transforming” in the face of new information.311 These are opposed to 
“ordinary capabilities,” which are directed to efficiency and the status 
quo.312 Discussing specifically the topic of uncertainty in innovation, Teece 
notes that bolstering dynamic capabilities allows a firm to change direction 
quickly and meet unknown challenges.313 Essentially, a firm should be like 
a boxer ready to bob and weave in the face of a competitor’s punches 
instead of merely running more quickly in one direction. 
Both of the above techniques make a firm more prepared, but they 
offer no guarantees that some surprising future consequence will not be 
debilitating. Moreover, since only some resource-rich firms typically 
prepare at this level to tackle uncertainty, it cannot entirely address the 
societal impact. For that, a broader policy response is called for. And 
indeed, institutions have evolved to better address harmful uncertainties 
and permit innovators the space to succeed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Debates regarding the structure and benefits of patent systems, the 
proper articulation of their rules, and the potential for disparate domestic 
and global impact are long-standing. However, the role of true uncertainty 
as a supporting or undermining player in innovation system incentives is 
understudied. Although superficial assessments have deemed uncertainty 
problematic, a deeper dive into the factors that impact innovator behavior 
demonstrates that there can be neutral or positive effects as well. A more 
sophisticated understanding is necessary to identify areas for reform and 
guide innovators or investors. 
A behavioral economics perspective highlights an innovator’s 
perceived competency about future events and potential for investment loss 
as the key factors influencing uncertainty impact. Using this guidance to 
review the current state of the law, one can see that three categories of legal 
uncertainty present themselves to inventors: (1) investment-killing; (2) if-
then; and (3) remedial uncertainly. Only the first creates a problem that 
must be addressed by legal reform; the others should be preserved as 
aspects of a healthy innovation system. If policymakers and firms employ 
this new typology in considering legal uncertainty, we are likely to move 
toward a more acceptable and powerful innovation system. 
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